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ABSTRACT 
The primary aim of this thesis is to reexamine the Islam-democracy debate through the 
lens of Wasatiyya, a contemporary tendency in Islam that espouses centrist positions on 
religious, political, cultural and other aspects of society. Wasatiyya asserts that Islam and 
democracy are inherently compatible because they share many defining features, from 
popular sovereignty and representative government, to separation of powers and freedom 
and human rights.  
Through documentary analysis of existing literature on Islam and democracy, this 
thesis examines Wasatiyya arguments supporting the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy, and analyzes how these arguments stand up against contemporary measures 
of democratic standards. These methods are geared toward the goal of determining the 
“democraticness” of Wasatiyya in conceptual terms, while examining its real world 
application through the Wasatiyya-backed Constitution of the Tunisian Republic.  
Wasatiyya encourages Muslims to strive to use reason within Islamic guidelines. 
It views the issue of Islam and democracy as a product of historical struggle within Islam 
to fit with modernity. Wasatiyya acknowledges that democracy has its pros and cons, but 
it is also convinced that today, democracy is the best form of government available that 
could promote the best interest of Islam and the Ummah (Muslim nation). 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary aim of this thesis is to reexamine the Islam-democracy debate 
through the lens of Wasatiyya.1 Wasatiyya is a contemporary tendency2 in Islam and 
Islamism that espouses moderate or centrist positions on religious, political, cultural and 
other aspects of society.3 Its proponents strongly believe that Islam and democracy are 
inherently compatible because they share many defining features.4 Despite this positive 
position on the subject, critics of moderate Islamism worldwide continue to question the 
movement’s credibility and real commitment to democratic ideals. Thus, the method of 
this thesis is twofold: First, it presents Wasatiyya arguments supporting the compatibility 
of Islam and democracy. And second, it analyzes how these arguments stand up against 
contemporary measures of democracy. These methods are geared toward the goal of 
determining the “democraticness”5 of the Wasatiyya tendency in Islam.      
B. IMPORTANCE  
The question whether Islam and democracy are compatible or not has remained 
one of the most important contemporary issues in the world, especially in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the ensuing American-led invasion of 
                                                 
1Also spelled Wasatiyyah, Wasatia, or Wasatteyyah; derived from the root Wasat, the middle ground 
or center in Arabic. 
2 The word tendency is used interchangeably with movement, current, stream, wave or trend to denote 
contemporary Islamist, Islamic or Islam-based way of thinking. 
3 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country's Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 40. 
4 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004),  77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
5 “Democraticness” denotes the level or degree of Wasatiyya’s conceptual and practical commitment 
to democratic ideals, such as freedom and universal human rights. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq.6 Today, it becomes even more relevant after the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring in late 2010 in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), affecting not 
only Muslims but non-Muslims as well. Three underlying currents emerged as the 
defining trends of the Arab Spring: The revolt against authoritarian regimes, manifested 
in the popular demand for the more empowerment through a democratic alternative; the 
revolt against extremism; and the struggle to revive Islam and integrate with the modern 
world.7 These trends therefore warrant a close reexamination of the potential of 
democracy to coexist and prosper with Islam in Muslim societies. 
1. Democratization in the Islamic World 
Democratization is the demand of a growing portion of the population for 
empowerment. Abrupt and invasive changes in society led to social upheavals and 
demands for political reform in the Muslim world.8 The fall of the Ottoman Empire after 
World War I allowed European powers to colonize the resource-rich Middle East, Africa 
and other parts of the developing world. Tunisia’s Rachid al-Ghannouchi, a leading 
proponent of Wasatiyya and founder of the Renaissance Party (Harakat An-Nahda or 
Ennahda), refers to the Western colonizers as the new world order that sought to preserve 
a status quo that suits its own interests.9 Colonization and imperialism permeated society 
                                                 
6 According to the Pew Research Center, when it comes to extremism and acts of terrorism, 81% of 
Muslims believe that suicide bombing is never or rarely justified by Islam. Of note, in the Palestinian 
Territory and Afghanistan, 40% and 39%, respectively, believe that suicide bombing is often or sometimes 
justified. 27% of Muslims are somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremists, while 9% are 
somewhat or very concerned about Christian extremists (15% are worried about both). Of the 50,000 
interviewed in the Gallup Poll, only 7% describe themselves as politically radicalized, of which only 13% 
believe that attacks on civilians are completely justified. Muslim radicals represent a tiny minority of the 
world’s 1.6 billion Muslims. According to Robert Pape, religion is not the primary driver of suicide attacks. 
Rather, the reason is political: A study on every terrorist attack between 1980 and 2004 reveals that 95% 
were driven by a clear strategic objective to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from 
their homeland. See The Pew Forum on Religious Life, The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics, and 
Society (Washington, D.C: The Pew Research Center, 2013), 68, and Robert Pape, “The logic of suicide 
terrorism,” The American Conservative, July 18, 2005, accessed February 15, 2014, 
http://amconmag.com/2005_07_ 18/article.html. 
7 Robin B. Wright, Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion across the Islamic World (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2011), 3-4. 
8 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle Edition, 13. 
9 Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), E-book, 106. 
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through World War II, followed by the Cold War which saw the rise of Arab nationalism 
coupled with state-sponsored rapid modernization programs, not to mention the 
beginnings of the ominous Arab-Israeli Conflict. The early success of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Arab nationalism was eclipsed by the frustration brought about by the defeat of 
the coalition of Islamic states against Israel, on top of the failure of the modernization 
programs to improve the economy. The troubled leaders turned to authoritarianism to 
safeguard their self-interest. They controlled the state, the economy, and most of (if not 
all) the important facets of human society, including religion.  
To al-Ghannouchi, democratization is the process of transforming authoritarian 
systems of government into democratic systems of government. The goal is for open and 
transparent competition for participation in government through free and fair elections to 
become the norm, with freedom and rights respected.10 The pressure of democratization 
on authoritarianism led to subtle relaxations on tight restrictions on society. This opening 
paved the way for the resurgence of Islamist movements, branding themselves as the real 
alternative to Western-backed autocratic regimes that were incapable of advancing 
people’s lives. To Wasatiyya and other Islamists, Islam is the key to redeeming Muslims 
from the grip of tyranny and oppression.11  
2. The Resurgence of Islam 
With democratization came the resurgence of Islam as the superior medium for 
change in troubled Muslim societies.12 Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood, exclaims that no regime in this world can empower Muslims and supply 
their needs for sociopolitical development like Islam can.13 Echoing the 19th Century 
Salafiyya Modernists, contemporary Islamists believe that a return to the fundamental 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 106. 
11 Yussuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 222. 
12 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle Edition, 11. 
13 Hasan al-Banna, “Toward the Light,” in Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and 
Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, ed. Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Q. Zaman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 59-60. 
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teachings of Islam is necessary to positively change society.14 Reminding Muslims about 
the virtues of their faith is a strong mechanism that promotes civic activism and a shift in 
political attitude. To Islamists, Muslims will achieve empowerment only through Islam.  
The Islamists capitalized on the fact that people identify themselves most with 
their faith, and the Muslim identity became the most powerful instrument for unity and 
opposition against political repression.15 As democracy became a widespread concept at 
the time, the Islamist also capitalized on the democratic appeal to attain mass support. 
The fusion of Islam and democracy became a powerful vehicle for societal change. The 
Islamists provided for the shortcomings of the state through civil society and community 
outreaches affording people with basic social services and education. These are perfect 
venues that offered ways to re-propagate the teachings of Islam that resonate to every 
Muslim, while at the same time conveying their political agenda. Through these 
outreaches, the Islamists gained considerable support and admiration from the people.16 
This popular support was showcased during the Arab Spring, when Islamists dominated 
the political aftermath.     
3. Democracy and the Rise of Islamism  
The demand for democracy and the resurgence of Islam in the midst of political 
failures and extremism in the region have reinvigorated the Islamist movements. The 
Islamists emerged as the main beneficiaries of the Arab Spring, among them the 
Wasatiyya movement. It is clear that Islamists are important players in the transformation 
of MENA, and the world must care because the region will only become more and more 
important in the decades to come. The proponents of democracy around the world must 
recognize the need to engage the Islamists if the transformation of MENA and the rest of 
the Muslim world is to succeed. Understanding the wide range of Islamist views on 
democracy, both positive and negative, will only facilitate the engagement process and 
                                                 
14 Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 3-4. 
15 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle edition, 16. 
16 Carrie R. Wickam, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 7. 
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improve the future outlook of Muslim countries and their relations with the rest of the 
globe.   
Today, the Islamists have shown their willingness to embrace democracy, albeit 
in varying degrees of commitment subject to people’s believability. Thus, far, they have 
participated in the democratic process of constitutionalism, free and fair elections, and 
party politics. But is this enough? Regardless of the currently under par political 
performance of the region based on Western standards, especially in the area of freedom 
and human rights, the actions of the Islamists undoubtedly indicate a desire for 
democracy infused with Islam. And this desire is a starting point in the argument that in 
fact, democracy and Islam could be compatible. Instead of being pessimistic, the world 
must look at the current situation as an opportunity to support and partake in the positive 
reshaping of the region. A crucial shift in the global worldview on Islam and Muslims is 
therefore essential, and this thesis aims to advance just that.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
By seamlessly presenting arguments rooted in an intricate balance of Islamic 
revelation and thoughtful reasoning (rationalism or ijtihad), Wasatiyya masterfully 
demonstrates that Islam and democracy share many fundamental principles and values, 
thus making them inherently compatible.17 But, a more important question remains: How 
democratic is Wasatiyya? It is therefore crucial to determine whether or not the 
Wasatiyya tendency satisfies the minimum thresholds of democratic standards.  
This thesis evaluates Wasatiyya based on three broad measures of democracy: 
Democratic regime, democratic governance, and the rule of law. Democratic regime 
constitutes access to government offices defined by the competiveness, inclusiveness, and 
fairness of the electoral system and candidate selection process. Democratic governance 
represents the institutional aspects of decision making and implementation, relations 
between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, and the organization of 
federalism and bureaucracy. Finally, the rule of law comprises government treatment of 
                                                 
17 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 77-78, and Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76. 
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its citizens defined by human and civil rights, levels of corruption, and freedom of 
expression.18 At a minimum, governments in the Muslim world already have the 
trappings of democratic regime and democratic governance, but they still score poorly in 
contemporary measures of democracy because they fail to meet the standards of the rule 
of law—the highest and most difficult requirement among the three broad standards of 
democracy.19 Thus, this thesis focuses on how Wasatiyya conceptually deals with the 
more pressing issues of marrying Islam and democracy, especially the issues involving 
the freedom and rights of women and non-Muslims in Muslim societies. 
The Arab Spring has seen the emergence of nascent democracies in MENA, 
especially in Tunisia where An-Nahda dominated recent elections.20 Though it may be 
premature to use the actual track record of Islamist parties like An-Nahda in the analysis 
of this thesis, their most recent political platform as embodied by their constitutions 
provides a conceptual glimpse to their potential for advancing democratization.     
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis focuses on two competing approaches that attempt to explain the 
democracy gap in MENA and other parts of the Muslim World: Cultural-essentialism, 
and the optimists who counter cultural-essentialism. In the spirit of taking the middle 
ground between the extremes, Wasatiyya presents itself as the third alternative approach 
to understanding Islam: A multifaceted force that has limitless potential to usher 
democracy in Muslim societies in a comprehensive effort to promote the best interest of 
the Ummah (Muslim nation or community).     
                                                 
18 Geraldo L. Munck, “Measures of Democracy, Governance, and the Rule of Law: An Overview of 
Cross-National Data Sets” (paper prepared for World Bank workshop on “Understanding Growth and 
Freedom from the Bottom Up,” Washington, DC, July 15-17, 2003). 
19 Freedom House, “New Study Details Islamic World's Democracy Deficit,” accessed January 21, 
2014, https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-study-details-islamic-worlds-democracy-deficit#.VHU6U4vF-
So. 
20 Noah Feldman, “Islamists’ Victory in Tunisia a Win for Democracy,” Bloomberg View, October 30, 




Perhaps the most controversial approach in explaining the democracy deficit in 
the Muslim world is cultural-essentialism. Cultural-essentialism asserts that people create 
certain patterns of behavior over time that becomes their culture, and culture becomes 
norms that in turn dictate people’s actions. Culture then becomes an unchangeable 
essence that defines the group, and cultural-essentialists believe that this unchanging 
essence is determinative of the group’s behavior.21  
For instance, proponents of cultural-essentialism indicate that the persistence of 
fundamentalism in Muslim societies is reflective of Islam’s universal and immovable 
nature: Anti-modern and anti-Western. Simply put, Islam is the culprit that inhibits the 
successful development of democracy in Muslim societies. Cultural-essentialists declare 
that Islam is the primary impediment of democratization in Muslim-majority states.22 
They claim that Islam does not permit the separation of religion and politics, and since 
they assume that this distinction is mandatory for democracy, Islam is inherently 
incompatible with democracy.23  
The primary conflict rests in the concept of tawhid, sovereignty of God, which 
cultural-essentialists view as paradoxical to the democratic concept of sovereignty of the 
people. Proponents of cultural-essentialism also advance that the supremacy of Shari’ah 
over the state, grounded in the idea that the state is established to implement Islamic law 
and not vice-versa, renders Islam incompatible with democracy. Additionally, they argue 
that Shari’ah is a legal system based strictly on religious tradition and elite (ulama) 
interpretations that fail to incorporate popular will and opinion. Even worse, they contend 
                                                 
21 R. D. Grillo, “Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety,” Anthropological Theory 3 (2003): 158. 
22 Lahouari Addi, “Islamicist Utopia and Democracy,” in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science: Political Islam, ed. Charles Butterworth and William Zartman (London: Sage 
Publications, 1992), 120-130, and Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview,” 
Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 52-63.   
23 Huntington argues that, “no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual 
and the secular.”  Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” Political Science 
Quarterly 99, no. 2 (1984): 208.   
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that Shari’ah does not take into account the will and opinion of non-Muslims and other 
minority groups within the Muslim community, including women to a certain extent.24  
Furthermore, cultural-essentialists believe that Islam inhibits pluralism, a 
hallmark of democracy defined by freedom of expression and tolerance of opposition, as 
Muslims aggressively advance Islam as the only true religion, which is final, applicable 
to every circumstance, and cannot be altered.25 They also argue that almost all 
democratic procedures such as elections, voluntary associations, multiparty politics, and 
an independent judicial system are historically missing in Islamic political tradition.26 
More adamantly, they argue that Islam lacks universal human rights, making it truly 
incompatible with democracy.27  
Overall, cultural-essentialists view Islam as a monolithic concept and institution 
that dominates all aspects of society, from the religious and cultural spheres, to the 
political and economic realms. Consequently, they believe that Muslim political attitudes 
are mostly influenced by their religion, and how they view democracy is highly 
dependent on how they understand Islam.28   
2. Counterpoint to Cultural-Essentialism 
Critics of cultural-essentialism point out that its monolithic view of culture creates 
a scenario of dualism, which perpetuates dichotomies along the lines of Samuel 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations:29 East versus West, right versus wrong, tradition 
versus modernity, Islam versus Christianity, etc. These entities are viewed as unitary 
actors that will never change and will always be at odds with each other. The opponents 
                                                 
24 Lahouari Addi, “Islamicist Utopia and Democracy,” in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science: Political Islam, ed. Charles Butterworth and William Zartman (London: Sage 
Publications, 1992), 120-130, and Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview,” 
Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 52-63.   
25 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Islamic Fundamentalism (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1996). 
26 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (London: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1994). 
27 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 217. 
28 Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003). 
29 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22– 49. 
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of cultural-essentialism assert that the approach overlooks Islam’s various interpretations 
and the many democratic values inherent in Islamic tradition.30 They emphasize the 
diversity of Islam like all religions, which can be interpreted as both beneficial and 
harmful to democracy.31  
Opponents of cultural-essentialism point out that Islam and democracy share 
many fundamental principles, such as justice, mercy, equality, and pluralism, and that the 
Islamic concepts of shura (consultation), ijtihad (independent reasoning) and ijma 
(consensus) attest to the democratic tradition in Islam.32  These democratic traditions 
were exemplified by the Constitution of Medina, the crowning achievement of Islam’s 
Golden Age during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his pious companions. 
They also indicate that the Qur’an and the Sunna, Islam’s holy sources of revelation, 
specifically mandate universal human rights such as freedom of religion33 and tolerance34 
regardless of the poor universal human rights track record of Muslim-majority 
governments today.   
Proponents of Islam as a flexible, multifaceted concept also highlight the 
similarities between Islam and Protestantism that are deemed as conducive to democracy. 
Unlike Roman Catholicism, Islam and Protestantism were founded without “priesthood 
with sacred powers” emphasizing egalitarianism rather than hierarchy.35 Finally, they 
point to the existence of democratic parties in the Muslim world today, such as Turkey’s 
                                                 
30 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004),  77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
31 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An Arab More than Muslim Electoral Gap,” Journal of 
Democracy 14 (2003): 40. 
32 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 
1996). 
33 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An Arab More than Muslim Electoral Gap,” Journal of 
Democracy 14 (2003): 40. 
34  Fatema Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (Cambridge, MA: Perseus 
Publishing, 1992). 
35 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: 
An Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 376. 
 10 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP), that attests to the 
positive attitude of Muslims toward democracy.36 
3. Wasatiyya: The Centrist Approach 
This thesis builds on the ideas of the opponents of cultural-essentialism, who 
believe that Islam and Islamism are both malleable and open to multiple interpretations 
based on the need to be pragmatic. Echoing the tradition set by the 19th Century Salafiyya 
Modernist movement in Islam and political Islam, Wasatiyya sees the issue of Islam and 
democracy as a product of historical struggle within Islam to fit with modernity. The 
ideological dimension is one of many facets of Muslims adjusting to a modern world 
shaped by Western innovations, institutions, and ideas.37 Therefore, rather than being a 
mere pragmatic adjustment to garner votes, it is actually a long-term historical rethinking 
of the role of Islam in modernity.38 Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to prove whether 
or not Wasatiyya’s claims on the compatibility of Islam and democracy are congruous to 
key ideals of modern measures of democracy. 
4. Do Muslims Want Democracy? 
Survey results show that there is broad support for democracy among majority of 
Muslims around the world. According to the Pew Research Center, Muslims were asked 
whether they prefer democracy or a strong leader (autocrat), and 62% of respondents 
from 37 countries surveyed believe that democracy is best able to address and solve their 
country’s problems. Only 31% prefer an autocratic/dictatorship system. The highest 
percentage of pro-democracy responses came from Muslims in Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa, with the average registering 75% or higher (e.g., 87% for Ghana and 67% for 
Malaysia). In MENA, support for democracy mirrors the global average of 62%, with 
Lebanon at 81% and Tunisia at 75%, compared to only 55% in Egypt and 48% in 
                                                 
36  The PML in Pakistan, the BNP in Bangladesh, the AKP in Turkey, and the PAN in Indonesia are 
all examples of Muslim democratic parties, which attempt to combine Islamic traditions with liberal 
democratic practice. See Seyyed Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 16, 
no. 2 (2005): 13-27.  
37 Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 3-4. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
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Jordan.39 Only 33% of respondents view religious conflict as a major issue in their 
countries. Finally, 57% of Muslims believe that there is no conflict between Islam and 
modern society.40 
Clearly, the fact that majority of Muslims believe that democracy can advance 
Islamic societies counters the cultural-essentialist view that Islam and democracy are 
inherently incompatible. After all, democracy is all about the political attitude of people 
and their political struggle.41 If Muslims wish to partake in the democratic process, they 
will surely find a way to make it work with Islam. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology of this thesis constitutes documentary analysis of existing 
literature on Islam and democracy from both Muslim and non-Muslim sources. The 
analysis of the Wasatiyya tendency focuses primarily on the views of its leading 
proponents, among them Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Muhammad Salim 
al-Awwa, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and the Wasatiyya-backed constitution42 of Tunisia’s 
An-Nahda Party.43 Works of Western authors that focus on centrist and liberal Islam and 
political Islam, such as John Esposito, Charles Kurzman, Raymond Baker and Bruce 
Rutherford, are also utilized.44  
                                                 
39 The Pew Forum on Religious Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society 
(Washington, D.C., The Pew Research Center, 2013), 60-61. 
40 Ibid., 114. 
41 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), xvii. 
42 Jasmine Foundation, trans., The Constitution of the Tunisian Republic: Unofficially Translated by 
Jasmine Foundation, (Tunis: Jasmine Foundation for Research and Communication, 2014). 
43 Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, “Islamist Parties in Power: A Work in Progress,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, May 23, 2012, accessed October 25, 2012, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/23/islamist-parties-in-power-work-in-progress/bklz# and  
44 See John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle Edition, Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), Raymond W. Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamist 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Bruce K. Rutherford, “What Do Egypt’s Islamists 
Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006). 
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Furthermore, this thesis employs literature providing contemporary measures of 
democracy.45 Specific elements of contemporary democratic measures will be used to 
explore how Wasatiyya deals with the complex issues that define democracy today, such 
as: Divine sovereignty versus popular sovereignty (which lies at the heart of the Islam-
democracy debate); Shari’ah versus man-made laws as sources of legislation (especially 
the issue of who decides what laws are Islamic or not); theocratic versus civilian form of 
Islamic government; party pluralism (when this could lead to atheistic parties); freedom 
of speech (when that speech could be considered blasphemous); freedom of religion 
(when this could result in apostasy under traditional Islam); women’s rights (when this 
conflicts with Islam’s traditional roles for women); and minority rights (when traditional 
Islam viewed them as protected subjects, not equal citizens). How Wasatiyya addresses 
all these important issues will be indicative of whether or not its concepts and practices, 
deeply rooted in Islam, could truly be compatible with today’s concept of democracy.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains six chapters. The first lays the foundation to the profoundly 
consequential debate in the compatibility of Islam and democracy and how Wasatiyya 
meaningfully contributes to the existing dialogues and discussions on the hefty subject. 
The debate remains very relevant today because of the complex and constantly evolving 
nature of politics in the Muslim world that has lasting effects on the global scale. The 
Muslim world is significant not only for its oil and constantly shifting sociopolitical 
circumstance; it is also home to the fastest growing religion in the world, which is second 
only to Christianity when it comes to total number of adherents.46  
                                                 
45 Geraldo L. Munck, “Measures of Democracy, Governance, and the Rule of Law: An Overview of 
Cross-National Data Sets” (paper prepared for World Bank workshop on “Understanding Growth and 
Freedom from the Bottom Up,” Washington, DC, July 15-17, 2003). 
46 Estimates indicate that there are 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide in 2010, a whopping 23% of the 
total world population (6.8 billion in 2010). This number is expected to grow in the years to come. From 
2000 to 2010, Islam grew at a rate of 1.83%, compared to 1.31% for Christianity and 0.72% for Judaism in 
the same period, making it the fastest growing religion in the last decade. See “Muslims,” Pew-Templeton 
Global Religious Futures Project, accessed October 1, 2014, http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org 
/religions/muslims., and Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, ed., The World’s Religions in Figures: An 
Introduction to International Religious Demography (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 10. 
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There will always be those who support the integration and development of 
democracy in Muslim society, and those who will continue to oppose the possibility and 
refuse to even give it a chance to take the first step in a long, and often challenging 
journey. But theoretically, it can work, as Wasatiyya exclaims that foundational 
frameworks exist that could support any effort to establish democracy in an Islamic 
setting.47 The real world application of Islamic and democratic principles codified in the 
Constitution of Tunisia is a testament to the potential of transforming the concept of 
Islamic democracy into reality.48 Tunisia’s An-Nahda has survived a more or less 
challenging transition to a new Tunisian Republic.49 This at least proves that, regardless 
of the outcome, moderate Islamist parties could be viable and trustworthy partners in the 
political transformation of Muslim states to the democratic system. The events in Tunisia 
further demonstrate that democracy is indeed a highly-contested and difficult 
undertaking.50 
Chapter II introduces Wasatiyya’s balanced and moderate philosophy that has 
empowered the movement to recognize, understand and embrace the true essence of 
democracy, as opposed to the close-minded others who dismiss it too easily based on 
their pre-existing and often incorrigible beliefs and traditions evenly spread across the 
conservative-liberal spectrum. Wasatiyya promotes authentic ijtihad (deliberate effort of 
independent reasoning; reason over passion) in appreciating the value in both the simplest 
and most complex ideas and objects, and democracy is not an exception.51  
                                                 
47 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
48 Jasmine Foundation, trans., The Constitution of the Tunisian Republic: Unofficially Translated by 
Jasmine Foundation, (Tunis: Jasmine Foundation for Research and Communication, 2014). 
49 Eileen Byrne, “Tunisia’s Islamist party Ennahda accepts defeat in elections,” The Guardian, 
October 27, 2014, accessed November 1, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/tunisia-
islamist-ennahda-accept-defeat-elections. 
50 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), Kindle Edition, 13. 
51 Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), E-book, 101. 
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Again, Wasatiyya believes that Islam is both malleable and open to multiple 
interpretations based on the need to be pragmatic. Although the proponents of Wasatiyya 
believe that the Qur’an (The Recitation, the word of God as revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad) and Sunna (Trodden path or traditions of the Prophet) are eternal, they also 
believe that the interpretations or understandings of man (i.e. Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
and rulings of jurist/scholars (fatwa52)) are not. Because democracy or form of 
government is not central to creed, it is a topic halal (permitted) for discussion and 
worthy of thorough analysis.53 As Yusuf al-Qaradawi puts it best, anything that promotes 
the best interest of the Ummah is open and encouraged for deliberation. It is ultimately up 
to the Ummah to decide whether anything is in accordance with the principles of Islam or 
not.54 
To Wasatiyya, one has to have an open mind in order to truly grasp the meaning 
of God’s creation. By eschewing extremist views and choosing the middle ground, 
Wasatiyya believes that it advocates the best position in everything: To be balance is to 
be just, and promoting justice is the most important step toward the righteous path to 
Allah. The goal of the state and the Ummah is to develop a just and balanced society, and 
to Wasatiyya democracy can do just that.55  
Chapter III explains the foundations, roles, and responsibilities of the state in 
Islam, and culminates with a well-defined vision of an Islamic polity based on democratic 
principles: An Islamic democracy. The state has a sacred social contract or covenant with 
the people that must be honored.56 Allah created man as his vice-regent, with free will to 
enjoin good and forbid evil. But He also created man different from each so other, so they 
                                                 
52 “Sharia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, last modified September 3, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_1.shtml. 
53 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 42. 
54 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 192. 
55 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 40. 
56 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 15. 
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would recognize the need to cooperate with each other and enjoy the merits of working 
together.57  
Social cooperation is the force behind the necessity of establishing a government 
which would unite the Ummah and manage its affairs.58 The source of power is the 
Ummah, and the ruler (the state or government), chosen or elected by the Ummah, must 
heed the consensus and advice of the people through their representatives in shura. The 
people shall obey and respect the ruler or government, so long as it upholds the best 
interest of Islam and the people. It becomes a duty for every Muslim to rebuke or replace 
the leader or the state when the sacred covenant is broken.59  
The role of Shari’ah cannot be overstated in an Islamic democracy. It is one of the 
most controversial topics in the Islam-democracy debate, as it is mostly viewed as harsh 
and restrictive in the West. Muslim opinions also vary when it comes to the extent of 
Shariah’s implementation.60 Wasatiyya believes that Shari’ah must be a source of the 
constitution of the Islamic state,61 but it also contends that Shari’ah’s proper and 
deliberate interpretation based on the current time and place demonstrates its flexibility 
and eternal role as a foundation of the Islamic state.62 Proponents of Islam and 
democracy subscribe to the distinction between Shari’ah and fiqh (Islamic law or 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 231. 
58 Khaled Abou El Fadl et al., Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 20. 
59 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 15. 
60 Opinions vary over the implementation of several features of Shari’ah and Islamic jurisprudence. 
Majority of Muslims (69%) are in favor of using the principles of Shari’ah in family and property law, but 
fewer respondents support the application of severe criminal punishments (whippings, cutting off hands, 
death by stoning, and other forms of corporal and capital punishments). A large majority of South Asian 
Muslims support severe criminal punishments (cutting off the hands of thieves at 81% and death for 
apostates or unbelievers at 76%). In MENA, the number drops to 57% for severe punishments and 56% for 
death penalty for apostasy. Both regions are in contrast with Muslims in other areas of the world: Southeast 
Asia (46% for severe punishments and 27% for death penalty); Central Asia (38% and 16%); and Southern-
Eastern Europe (36% and 13%). See John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a 
Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 48, and The Pew Forum on Religious Life, 
The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society (Washington, D.C: The Pew Research Center, 2013), 
pdf, 43-44. 
61 Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), E-book, 101. 
62 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 87-88. 
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jurisprudence). They regard Shari’ah as the compass (God’s revelation, eternal and 
applicable to every time and place) and fiqh as the map: The map must conform to the 
compass.63  
By extension, an Islamic democracy must conform to Islamic principles. 
Wasatiyya’s vision of Islamic democracy melds the principles of Islam and democracy 
seamlessly, demonstrating that a state based on Islamic and democratic values is not a 
pipe dream but a tangible endeavor. Plus, they believe that an Islamic democracy has 
already been established before, during the Golden Age of Islam which boasts the 
Constitution of Medina. They consider Medina as one of the earliest occurrences of 
democracy, which to them predates and supersedes modern democracies in every way.64  
Again, Wasatiyya presents a solid argument supporting the compatibility of Islam 
and democracy by linking fundamental Islamic principles that equate to the ideals of 
democracy.65 Chapter IV provides the Islamic sources and traditions that attest to the 
existence of popular sovereignty in Islamic polity. From election and voting, to 
representative government and the multiparty system, Wasatiyya clearly demonstrates 
that these democratic principles are inherently present in Islam: The institution of shura 
(consultation), ijma (consensus), bay’a (pledge of allegiance), and the Constitution of 
Medina which granted protection and respect for the freedom and rights of Muslim 
citizens and non-Muslim minorities, among others.66  
Along the same lines, Chapter V demonstrates the significance of the rule of law 
as exemplified by freedom and universal human rights in Islam, from equality of both 
men and women under the eyes of God and the law, to minority rights, religious freedom, 
and freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and free press. The instances and 
                                                 
63 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think 
(New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 53. 
64 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 47. 
65 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
66 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 78-80. 
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passages from the Islamic sources in both Chapters IV and V are all backed by provisions 
guaranteeing their preservation and protection by the Constitutions of Tunisia. Thus, the 
concepts of power originating from the people, consent, and freedom and rights are at the 
heart of the Islamic tradition and sociopolitical heritage.67 
Finally, Chapter VI answers the question, “Is Wasatiyya democratic?” and 
provides several key areas of contention that continues to perpetuate the Islam-
democracy debate, while subsequently offering a concise prescription on the way ahead. 
  
                                                 
67 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
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II. WASATIYYA: THE CENTRIST TENDENCY IN ISLAM 
This chapter discusses the roots and main tenets of Wasatiyya, the centrist 
tendency in Islam which espouses moderation and balance.68 Wasatiyya’s centrist 
perspective enables its proponents to freely discuss the merits of a democratic system 
rooted in Islamic principles.69 It claims that though the provisions in the Qur’an and 
Sunna of the Prophet are eternal and undebatable, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is not.70 
This leads Wasatiyya to the conclusion that democracy is a topic acceptable for debate 
and discussion, because the Qur’an and Sunna do not specify a form of government 
which Muslims must establish. Islam only provides the principles and values upon which 
the state must be founded.71 The goal of the state is to promote the best interest of Islam 
and the Ummah, and Wasatiyya believes that democracy can usher the advancement of 
Islam and Muslim society in the age of modernity and globalization.72  
Wasatiyya believes that Islam and Islamism are both malleable and open to 
multiple interpretations based on the need to be pragmatic. Echoing the tradition set by 
the 19th Century Salafiyya modernist movement in Islam and political Islam, Wasatiyya 
sees the issue of Islam and democracy as a product of historical struggle within Islam to 
fit with modernity. The ideological dimension is one of many facets of Muslims adjusting 
to a modern world shaped by Western innovations, institutions, and ideas.73 Therefore, 
                                                 
68 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 40. 
69 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Fallah Foundation, 2004), 77-78; Azzam Tamimi, 
Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), E-book, 76; 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
Kindle Edition, and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996). 
70 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 42. 
71 Ibid., 44. 
72 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Islam and Democracy,” in Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and 
Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, ed. Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Q. Zaman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 230. 
73 Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 3-4. 
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rather than being a mere pragmatic adjustment to amass popular support, it is actually a 
long-term historical rethinking of the role of Islam in modernity.74 
A. WASATIYYA IN THE SACRED SOURCES 
Qur’an 2:143 signifies the foundation of Wasatiyya in Islam: “We made you of an 
Ummah justly balanced that you might be witnesses over the nations and the Messenger 
as witness over yourselves.”75 The community of justly balanced believers, the Ummatan 
Wasatan, has become the unifying theme of the global Islamic Ummah. The goal of the 
Ummah is to promote justice through balance, by eschewing extreme ideologies and 
extravagance in its perpetual quest to become a justly balanced society.76  
Wasat, Arabic for center or middle ground—the root of Wasatan and Wasatiyya, 
is synonymous to justice (adl) and balance (i’tidal), indicating a position that is in the 
center or middle of both extremes. To showcase the similarity and interchangeability of 
wasat, adl and i’tidal in addition to Ummatan Wasatan, Wasatiyya invokes Qur’an 
42:17, which reveals that God sent the Scripture with truth and balance (justice). The 
connection between justice and balance is further stipulated in Qur’an 57:25, which 
states that the Messenger was sent and God revealed through him the Book and the 
Balance so that people will uphold justice. Being balance therefore connotes the 
implementation of justice. Thus, wasat, adl and i’tidal are all antonyms for injustice, 
radicalism, extremism, and excess.77  
Wasat also means the heart or the core of the matter: The center of all.78 In a 
world full of dichotomies like East versus West, secular versus religious, conservative 
versus liberal, capitalism versus communism, etc., Wasatiyya connotes non-alignment, or 
the willingness to have a moderate view and open mind that represents the best position 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 3. 
75 M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, trans., The Qur’an: A New Translation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 16.  
76 Sagi Polka, “Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping 
of the Country’s Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003):  40. 
77 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “The Middle Grounds of Islamic Civilisation: The Qur’ānic Principle 
of Wasatiyyah,” IAIS Journal of Civilisation Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 9. 
78 Ibid., 9. 
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between two opposing extremes. As justice is one of the most sacred virtues of Islam, the 
principles of Wasatiyya parallel the highest principles in Islam. Therefore, Wasatiyya, 
through moderation, represents the best position, the best choice, or the best point of view 
in Islam. 
Allah demands commitment to moderation, to justice, to doing what is good and 
eschewing evil (hizbah) in order for man to remain His true witness. The true believers 
must never stray from the best path—the path of moderation, justice and righteousness—
or they will cease to become believers. Moderation is also a responsibility, a personal call 
to spread the word of God because the middle nation (Ummatan Wasatan) is created 
justly balanced and blessed with the ability, thus the responsibility, to mediate between 
all people and nations on earth.79  
The Ummah will only remain united if it upholds the values of moderation and 
justice. The powerful Muslim virtue of enjoining good and forbidding evil (hizbah) forms 
the vital foundation of Islamic belief which lies at the heart of the debate on Islam and 
democracy. What is clear here is that an Islamic state constitutes a state of believers: 
People who govern and are governed by the highest standards of Islamic morality and 
principles. And this is particularly germane to the nascent governments which emerged 
after the Arab Spring. As Hasan al-Banna puts it best, Islam bequeaths Muslims with the 
strongest and most sincere gift of morality—founded on deep faith, unwavering 
constancy, great self-sacrifice, and considerable tolerance—to achieve certain success in 
every endeavor they wish to undertake.80   
B. ISLAMIC MODERNISM: ROOTS OF WASATIYYA 
1. The Salafiyya Modernists 
The 19th Century saw the emergence of the first wave of Islamic modernism. 
Among them are the Salafiyya Modernists, which became the precursor to contemporary 
                                                 
79 Qur’an 2:143. 
80 Hasan al-Banna, “Toward the Light,” in. Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and 
Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, ed. Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Q. Zaman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 66-67. 
 22 
Islamist movements, from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) and 
Pakistan’s Islamic Society (Jamaat-i-Islami), to the contemporary Salafists and 
Wasatiyya movements. Among the leading Islamic Modernists were Jamal ad-Din al-
Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. The most important point to understand 
about the Islamic Modernists is that their methodology requires that Muslims go back to 
the original sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna, and formulate new laws based on 
new interpretations, as opposed to following the traditions of the four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence. By insisting on going back to the original sources, they created room for 
innovation and adaptation to modernity.81  
Similar to the Christian Reformation experience, the 19th Century Salafiyya 
Modernists formed their own understanding of the sacred texts and challenged the ulama 
(elite group of scholars/jurists) and their outdated interpretation based on self-conscious 
Islamic discourse.82 The ulama is accused of too much taqlid (imitation) of traditions and 
of closing the gates of ijtihad (independent reasoning, interpretation or effort). For them, 
the era of colonization and imperialism has ushered the decline of the Ummah and the 
corruption of the ulama, who were too concerned with issues that were often irrelevant to 
the current context or situation.83  
The Salafiyya Modernists believe that the Golden Age of Islam advocated for 
reason, which coincides with the rationality and positivism that modernity espouses.84 
They advocate for a rejuvenation of Islamic thought through a return to the real essence 
of Islam, exemplified by the Golden Age—the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the Al-
Khulafah ar-Rashidun (Rightly-Guided Caliphs) and their Sahaba (Companions), who 
brought the faith to its apex—instead of just blindly following the religious consensus 
and legal rulings of the corrupted ulama. Salafiyya is derived from Salaf al-salih, the 
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righteous ancestors of Islam, which means a modernist movement guided by the ways of 
the righteous ancestors.85 Today, one of the cornerstones of Wasatiyya is the balance 
between revelation and reason as previously advocated by the Salafiyya Modernists.    
The Salafiyya Modernists also believe that the main cause of Islamic decline in 
the age of colonialism and modernization is a divided Ummah, heralded by the neglect of 
the ulama, who are supposed to lead the Ummah, in reimagining Islam to best suit the 
demands of the modern age. The solution lies in going back to the basics of Islam in 
order to strengthen and re-unite the Muslim community. Al-Afghani and Abduh advocate 
for an internal reformation of Islam: A self-reflection in Muslim society. Concurring with 
Al-Afghani and Abduh, Rida adds that internal reform is achieved through education. 
Knowledge through education empowers Muslims to seek out the original spirit of the 
Qur’an and Sunna, instead of just relying on the ulama, and to reinterpret the sacred 
sources under the auspices of modernity to advance their situation. Most importantly, the 
pursuit of knowledge through education advances the development of rationality and 
positivism, key attitudes necessary for Muslim society, or any society for that matter, to 
succeed in the context of modernity.86 The ulama was too stuck in its narrow views, 
which constitute strict adherence to the established schools of Islamic jurisprudence, so it 
was unable to adapt and reinterpret Islam to best promote the interest of Muslims in the 
changing world.    
In summary, the Salafiyya Modernists sought to unite the Ummah by re-opening 
the gates of ijtihad through education in order to recreate the conditions of the Golden 
Age in the present time. They all acknowledge that modernity has its pros and cons, and 
that Muslims must strive to use reason within Islamic guidelines to flourish under 
modernity.87 The ulama decried innovation and learning from modern ideas as un-
Islamic, including those that would surely advance Islam and Muslims under modernity. 
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So instead of simply acquiescing with what history and traditions of Islamic 
jurisprudence dictate, the Salafiyya Modernist encourage people to see pass this 
obstruction and look for guidance in the Islamic holy sources themselves. Only through 
this will Muslims find ways to reinterpret the sacred teachings of Islam to bless and 
empower their endeavors to innovate and thus succeed in the modern age.     
C. THE MAIN TENETS OF WASATIYYA 
Wasatiyya believes that Islam is a true and comprehensive religion, encompassing 
all facets of life as revealed in Qur’an 16:89: The Scripture was sent explaining 
everything.88 Therefore, Islam is not only applicable to religious aspects but also to 
cultural, social, economic, political and other spheres of human interaction.89 Wasatiyya 
believes in the supremacy of God and the teachings of the Prophet. Yet unlike its more 
rigid counterparts, the movement pays special attention in applying rationality (ijtihad) 
and human experience in guiding the Ummah toward a better present and future.90 
Learning from past experiences and traditions through ijtihad is pivotal to the success of 
the global Muslim community.  
Wasatiyya espouses the 19th Century Salafiyya Modernists’ emulation of the 
Prophet Muhammad and the pious ancestors during the Golden Age of Islam, while also 
actively pursuing ways to achieve a sustainable balance between tradition and 
modernity.91 In this sense, Wasatiyya believes that borrowing from the best aspects of 
global society, whether Muslim or non-Muslim (like democracy), is encouraged, as long 
as they are implemented in an Islamic way.92 Yusuf al-Qaradawi adds that Islam does not 
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in any way prohibit borrowing ideas from other culture or nations. As long as it does not 
violate Islam and serves the best interest of the Ummah, borrowing from the great 
concepts of non-Muslims is allowed. The challenge remains for Muslims to not just 
transplant the borrowed idea, but to make it their own by melding it with their existing 
ideas and values.93  
Another key principle of Wasatiyyah is the pursuit of balance between the fixed 
(thawabit) and modifiable (mutaghayyirat) aspects of Islam.94 Anything related to creed 
(aqida) is final and cannot be changed.95 The issues relating to creed are already settled 
and cannot be reopened or debated by the Ummah. This includes the sacred revelation in 
the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. There are subject areas considered roots (usul) 
and branches (furu’) that are open to ijtihad (deliberation) but requires the guidance of 
the learned scholars or the ulama. Yet Wasatiyya also castigates the degraded role of the 
ulama, like Al-Azar in Cairo, for being an apparatus of the authoritarian state rather than 
the uncorrupted guide of the Ummah. Echoing Hasan al-Banna, the Wasatiyya movement 
acknowledges differences of interpretation, although all agree on the necessity of unity 
on fundamental principles while accepting disagreements on secondary issues.96 
The modifiable aspect of Islam, the branches (furu’), is integral to the Wasatiyya 
Movement’s affirmative position on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The 
debate is considered a branch or subsidiary issue.97 Hence, the debate is allowable and 
open to interpretation according to the changing sociopolitical and economic context. 
This adaptable aspect of Islam is critical to the renewal the religion’s appeal. Renewal is 
necessary to improve the total Islamic experience. Quoting from a famous hadith 
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(reported sayings and conduct of the Prophet),98 al-Qaradawi cites the Prophet saying that 
Allah will send to the Ummah in the beginning of every one hundred years a man who 
will rejuvenate Islam.99  
Branches or issues not relating to creed include forms of government and 
punishment.100 Caliph Umar altered forms of punishment during his reign. So if 
punishment is modifiable, then surely form of government falls under the same category. 
Rachid al-Ghannouchi points out that Islam has not outlined a specific formula for the 
public’s involvement in running the affairs of the Ummah. By leaving this open, Islam 
renders it possible for the Muslim intellect to be creative in the field of government and 
benefit from human experiences. As long as the issue does not violate the sacred and 
fixed commandments of Islam, it is open to independent reasoning and interpretation.101   
D. CONCLUSION 
Wasatiyya’s balanced and moderate philosophy on Islam empowers the 
movement to recognize, understand and embrace the true essence of democracy. Because 
democracy or form of government is not central to creed, it is therefore halal (permitted) 
for discussion and thorough analysis.102 As al-Qaradawi puts it best, anything that 
promotes the best interest of the Ummah is open and encouraged for deliberation.103 It is 
ultimately up to the Ummah to decide whether anything, democracy included, is in 
accordance with the principles of Islam or not. The goal of the state, which will be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter, is to create a just and balanced society, and to 
Wasatiyya democracy can do just that.104  
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III. WASATIYYA VIEWS ON THE STATE AND ISLAM  
This chapter discusses how Wasatiyya envisions the Islamic state and its 
foundations rooted in Islam, culminating with a vision of an Islamic democracy. 
Wasatiyya claims that the democratic concept of the state is in harmony with the Islamic 
concept of a government based on Islamic principles and guidelines, furthering its 
argument that democratic ideals are not only intrinsic but are celebrated in Islam.105 
According to Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Wasatiyya frames the Islam-democracy debate using 
the fiqh of balance. If the issue in question serves the best interest of Islam and Muslims, 
then it is halal.106 He insists that those who argue that democracy equals disbelief lack a 
clear conception of the matter.107  
A. FOUNDATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
First and foremost, it is critical to reiterate that Islam is not just a “religion” as 
defined by prevailing Western conventions. Religion is only one of the five necessities 
that Islam seeks to preserve, the others being souls, intellect, offspring and property. 
Therefore, Islam is not just based on religious theology, but more importantly on human 
interactions such as politics, economics, culture, and every other aspect of life.108 As 
Hasan al-Turabi remarks, the state is only the political manifestation of Islamic society. 
There is no Islamic state without Islamic society.109 Therefore, there is no Islamic state 
without Islam. 
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Al-Qaradawi explains that there are three foundations of the Islamic state: Unity 
of all Islamic lands, however many countries or territories; the constitution must be 
derived on the Qur’an and Sunna; and central leadership must be the greatest Imam or 
Caliph fit to rule the believers.110 The state also guarantees that non-Muslims are 
protected so long as they abide by Islamic law (The rights of non-Muslims will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter V). Rulers must rule with justice and mercy and the people 
must obey the ruler so long as he or she obeys Allah.111 These three foundations of the 
state are best exemplified by the most fundamental Islamic principles of tawhid (unity of 
God; monotheism), risalat (prophethood) and khilafat (caliphate or vice-regency).112  
1. Tawhid, Risalat and Khilafat 
The combination of tawhid and risalat in Qur’an 3:64 is the conviction that there 
is no other God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet (shahada or profession of faith: 
The first pillar of Islam). Belief in one God is a common rudimentary thread that unites 
all Muslims around the world into a single community of believers: The global Ummah.  
As a source of constitution, Qur’an 16:89 declares that the Scripture was sent 
explaining everything: A Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to all Muslims. Qur’an 4:58-
59 further expounds that God’s revelation is the reference point that guides all human 
affairs. Simply put, all aspects of society, including the state, must adhere to the 
fundamental values and principles set forth by the Qur’an and Sunna. This serves as the 
rationale to why majority of Muslims want Islam, as embodied in Shari’ah, to play a role 
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in the governance of the state and legislations.113 Only through servitude to God will the 
Ummah be united into a justly balanced society. 
The great Islamic philosopher Ibn Khaldun defines khilafat (vice-regency; 
leadership; caliphate; the state or government) as guiding the public to recognize and 
consider their interest in both life and the afterlife.114 Khilafat exudes leadership by 
virtue of the fact that God created man as His vice-regent on earth, imparting him with 
the faculties of the mind, free will, and freedom and rights that can neither be taken away 
nor violated. God has blessed the Muslim nation so it could serve as an example and lead 
the world towards the path of God. Leadership is therefore key to promoting the best 
interest of Islam and the Ummah.  
In the Islamic state, the importance of vice-regency is invested in shura and ijma 
(Qur’an 9:71). The leader, whether he or she is a governor, president, caliph or imam, 
does not rule in Allah’s name but that of the Ummah, whose consensus is sanctioned by 
God by virtue of its status as a community of vice-regents. Hasan al-Turabi explains that 
the state is the political dimension of the Ummah’s collective endeavor.115 Hence, the 
ruler or the state is dependent on the will of the entire Muslim community. The Caliph 
Uthman proclaimed that Allah fulfills by means of authority (state) that which is not 
fulfilled by means of the Qur’an.116 Authority springs from the Ummah, the state as a 
whole, which chooses, supervises, advises, and discharges the ruler from his office if 
necessary.117 
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Abu A’la Maududi gives a detailed description of the significance of tawhid, 
risalat and khilafat in the Islamic state. According to him, the “theocracy” built up by 
Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but by the whole community of 
Muslims including the rank and file. The entire Muslim population runs the state in 
accordance with the Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet. Maududi observes that in 
this system, “every Muslim who is capable and qualified to give a sound opinion on 
matters of Islamic law, is entitled to interpret that law of God when such interpretation 
becomes necessary. In this sense the Islamic polity is a “democracy.” But it is a 
“theocracy” in the sense that no one, not even the whole Muslim community united, has 
the right to change an explicit command of God.” It is important to note the recognition 
that decisions have to be made regarding interpretation and when to interpret.118  
The foundations of the Islamic state may seem contradictory to democracy at first 
glance, especially the seemingly inseparable union between religion and state. But the 
concept of unity, requiring a constitution based on noble, agreed upon principles, and 
electing the best leadership are all fundamentally democratic. Again, Islam is the most 
important aspect of Muslim society. So any Muslim government will be heavily 
influenced by Islam, in line with the Wasatiyya belief that the state must be founded upon 
the principles of the faith. 
B. THE STATE AND SHARI’AH 
1. The Righteous Path 
Shari’ah (literally the path to water, understood as the righteous path to God) is 
among the most controversial topics in the Islam-democracy compatibility debate.119 
Many believe that it is an outdated concept which breaks convention with modern 
standards of universal human rights and morality, particularly its severe punishments 
                                                 
118 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996). Kindle Edition, 24. 
119 “Sharia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, last modified September 3, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/ islam/beliefs/sharia_1.shtml. 
 31 
(hudud)120 that immediately come to mind when discussing the matter. Shari’ah leads 
many to conclude that Islam and democracy are simply incompatible.  
Yet Wasatiyya believes that like the evolution of Western societies, Muslim 
society is still evolving. There are still hardcore traditionalists in the West who still 
subscribe to the literal reading of the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and the same 
applies to other cultures and religions in the world, including Islam. Wasatiyya argues 
that though the principles of Shari’ah are perpetual, its interpretation can be flexible 
enough to adapt in the ever-changing reality of the modern world.121 The centrist 
movement subscribes to the distinction between Shari’ah and fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). To them, Shari’ah is the compass (God’s revelation, eternal and 
applicable to every time and place) and fiqh (human interpretation or understanding) is 
the map: The map must conform to the compass.122 
Shari’ah deliberately refrains from providing detailed regulations for the entire 
manifold changing requirements of social existence. Rachid al-Ghannouchi notes that 
while the Qur’an and Sunna perpetuate the existence of Islamic society, ijtihad, shura, 
and ijma are among the many mechanisms by which society materializes and develops. 
He makes a clear cut distinction between the authority of Shari’ah, whose supremacy as 
the source of law and legitimacy is unquestionable, and fiqh, fikr (thought), and tofsir 
(interpretation), which are tools or mechanisms that collectively make up the process of 
translating divine principles into practical measures.123  
All forms of comprehension and interpretation lie within the realm of ijtihad, and 
can therefore be accepted or rejected by the Ummah. In other words, the applicability of 
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ijtihad always depends on its acceptability. Al-Ghannouci agrees with Maududi in 
asserting that no theocratic authority exists in Islam, and that no one person or group, not 
even the ruler or the state, can claim to have the sole right to interpret religious texts, to 
speak in the name of God, or to claim to be God’s shadow on earth. Shari’ah is immune 
from abuse as long as its interpretation is not monopolized and manipulated by religious 
or political bodies of power, like the ulama after the Golden Age of Islam and the 
combination of repressive autocratic regimes that follow, whom many blame for the 
unravelling of Muslim civilization.  
The objective of Shari’ah is to realize the main interest of mankind.124 It promotes 
the best interest of Islam and the Ummah, extending to the welfare of each and every 
individual (tahqiq masalih al-’ibad).125 The goal of the state must be to safeguard and 
guarantee the welfare of the people. Shari’ah, among others, is an essential means for the 
state to achieve this.  
2. Set of Moral Principles and Guidelines 
Wasatiyya believes that the Islamic state must be based on Shari’ah.126 But 
Khaled Abou El Fadl notes the distinction between the supremacy of law and the 
supremacy of a set of legal rules when interpreting Shari’ah.127 Wasatiyya posits that 
instead of perceiving Islamic law as a set of legal rules that constrain government, it 
should be viewed as a set of moral principles and guiding values which binds the law-
making process and the resulting product itself. This means that every law passed must 
take into account the moral basis and the implications to the Ummah, specifically 
answering the question whether or not it serves the best interest of Islam and the 
community. Simply speaking, laws must be created and implemented with Islamic 
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morality and the welfare of the people in mind, especially with respect to basic freedom 
and human rights.128  
Under the alternative view of the rule of law, binding the government law-making 
process and the laws it passes to the moral principles of Shari’ah translates into 
procedural guarantees that could prevent government from misusing Shari’ah for its own 
gain. Moreover, it reinforces the principle that government cannot use Shari’ah to 
undermine the freedom and rights of the individual members of the Ummah.129 This is the 
original mandate of the ulama: To ensure that laws are based on the moral principles of 
Islam and serve the best interest of the people.130  
Problems arise when the state becomes unrestricted by its use of the Shari’ah to 
expand its reach and remain in power. This is predominantly associated with the decline 
of the symbolic importance of the ulama in the modern age. Among others, the ulama 
functions as a check to government. The ulama believes that Shari’ah is the foundation 
of laws, and politics is created to protect it.131 During the pre-modern years of Islam, the 
ulama was a powerful class that had the monopoly in regulating and interpreting whether 
the laws passed by government are in accordance to Shari’ah or not. They fulfilled this 
role by insisting that rulers must consult with them on all things legal. They were not the 
rulers, but they effectively curtailed the legislative powers of the government, and often 
represented the voice of the people.  
El Fadl points out that modernity has transformed the ulama from being the 
representative of the people into the puppet of dictatorships, often imposing strict and 
conservative interpretations of the law with an aim to preserve the status quo. The state 
has now become the legislator and law enforcer at the same time, unrestrained in utilizing 
Shari’ah in order to undermine Shari’ah.132 This is clearly a perversion of the essence of 
Shari’ah.    
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3. Flexibility of Shari’ah 
Again, the goal of Shari’ah is to achieve the best interest of Islam and Muslims 
under the context of current time and space.133 Careful consideration should be used to 
ensure that leaders use laws and judgments based on the best interest of the Ummah in the 
current circumstance. For example, a hadith reports that the Caliph Umar did not 
distribute the spoils of war when he conquered Iraq. His companions accused him of 
violating the example of the Prophet who distributed the booty from the Battle of 
Khaybar, thus breaking Shari’ah. In the current context, Umar saw it wise to reserve the 
booty for the incoming generation of Muslims. Though it did not follow the Prophet’s 
Sunna, Umar based his judgment on Qur’an 59:10, which states that the spoils of war 
were reserved and distributed to the immigrants who arrived later.134   
For many Muslims, Allah is the only source of legislation. But this does not mean 
that man does not have the right to legislate at all. Muslims have the right to make laws 
and judgments (enforcing the principles of God) for themselves, provided that these 
legislations only pertain to matters with no clear provisions from the holy sources. In a 
hadith, these issues, which include a great deal of people’s life, are described as “passed 
over” by Allah, and they are flexible.135 Case and point is the operationalization of the 
concepts of shura, ijma and ijtihad after the death of the Prophet, when the Ummah 
legislated on everything except on those that are definite, fixed, and imposed rules in the 
Qur’an.  
C. THE STATE IN ISLAM 
1. The Mandate of the State 
Islam literally means “submission, surrender or commitment” to Allah, and He 
has revealed His word through the Prophet to guide man in managing his affairs. The 
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word Muslim means “the one who submits” to the will of God.136 Many claim that Islam 
is also related to the word salam (peace or safety), and to Muslims around the world it is 
only through complete and unquestioning submission to God that they will find peace.137 
This perpetual search for peace led to the creation of Islamic principles and laws that 
must be adhered upon in order to unite the Ummah. The concept of leadership (used 
interchangeably with the concept of government or state) emerged from the necessity to 
have an overarching agent that will unite the Ummah and promote its best interest.138  
It is an obligation in Islam to join, obey and support the state, and to enjoy the 
bounty and protection under its banner (Qur’an 8:72, 89, 97–99).139 Qur’an 4:58-59 also 
underlines the foundation of government in Islam: The people have invested their trust in 
the leader, and Allah commands the leader to preserve that trust and uphold justice, and 
commands the people to obey the leader and uphold justice. In a hadith, the Prophet 
Muhammad warns against the violation of this sacred trust or covenant: “If the trust is 
lost, wait for the hour,” and “If the affair is entrusted to people other than the deserving 
ones, wait for the hour.” Violating this two-way trust between the leader and the people 
ultimately leads to the demise of the Ummah.140  
Allah also commands Muslims to refer to Him and the Prophet (the Qur’an and 
Sunna) when they are in disagreement.141 Hence, the Islamic state must establish a 
constitution based on the principles of Islam as the foundation of the law. To this effect, 
the Caliph Uthman said that, “Allah fulfills by means of authority (state or government) 
that which is not fulfilled by means of the Qur’an.”142 This serves as the cornerstone of 
an Islamic state governed by Islamic law and principles.  
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El Fadl cites Ibn Khaldun and Muhammad al-Ghazali, pioneers of early modern 
Islamic thought, in asserting that the state is necessary to control man, who is “by nature 
fractious, contentious, and not inclined towards cooperation,” and guide him to uphold 
justice and promote the public good. Habib al-Mawardi and Ibn Abi Rabi’, also pioneers 
in modern Islamic thinking, retort that God created man weak and needy so that he would 
cooperate with others based on necessity. Together they are more resistant to doing 
injustice by promoting the interest of the weak and curbing the interest of the strong.143 
Allah created people different and unique from each other so they would find it in their 
best interest to work with each other to compensate for their personal weakness and 
achieve their goals.  
In a more optimistic view of human nature, man is also said to inherently seek 
justice, and he finds that it is only through cooperation that justice can be achieved. So 
the primary role of the state is to further the cooperation of the Ummah and achieve unity, 
with the goal of becoming a justly balanced society.144 Here, the complex mechanisms of 
cooperation and diversity aimed at achieving justice, which equates to peace, reveal 
another dynamic link between Islam and democracy.  
According to al-Qaradawi, Islam advocates unity, organization and responsibility, 
and forbids disorder of all forms. Esposito and Voll add that in Islam, authority is 
preferred over anarchy, and there was a tendency among Muslims to identify anything 
that appeared to cause anarchy as being fitnah (wickedness).145 Authority or leadership, 
in the form of a state, is necessary to prevent fitnah and any other internal or external 
threats to Islam and its believers. 
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2. Choosing a Leader 
Choosing a leader, whether by appointment or election, is an important Islamic 
duty.146 Al-Qaradawi cites the Prophet in a hadith who ordered Muslims to form a row 
during prayer and appoint the most knowledgeable among them as the prayer leader: 
“Appoint one of you as your Amir.”147 During travels, the Prophet also ordered the 
people “to appoint one of them as the Amir if three persons set out on a journey.”148  
Citing Ibn Tammiyah, al-Qaradawi exclaims that people need each other, and 
they must live together and appoint a leader who will lead the Ummah in promoting the 
best interest of Islam and the nation.149 So the role of the state does not only entail the 
protection of people from external and internal threats, but it must also lead and educate 
the Ummah on the teachings of Islam in order to create a just community.150  
3. The Essence of the Islamic State 
Raouf Ebeid cites Louis Cantori, a political scientist who specialized in Islam, 
stating that a democratic Islamic state corresponds to the concept of “republican Islam,” 
which has three fundamental principles. First, divine revelation is the core of Islamic 
heritage, past and present. Second, the Ummah takes precedence over the individual, in 
its quest of becoming a just and balanced society (though individuals, as vice-regents of 
God, possess inviolable freedoms and rights that must be honored). And third, the goal of 
society is to enjoin good and forbid evil.151  
Cantori uses the term “republican” in reference to Ancient Rome’s polity, which 
he believes to have exemplified the following: The limitation of the powers of a strong 
yet benevolent and moral state; a political elite devoted to serve the public good 
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(maslahah); a citizenry committed to serve society; and a community which respects the 
law.152 This serves as a great segue to the next section: Wasatiyya’s vision of an Islamic 
democracy. 
D. A VISION OF ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 
Once again, Wasatiyya subscribes to the idea that Islam does not prescribe a 
specific form of government for Muslims: It only provides the underlying foundations 
that an Islamic government must take and be founded upon.153 Government is an essential 
requirement to implement the comprehensive and multidimensional nature of Islam. 
Qur’an 8:72 declares that it is every Muslim’s obligation to join, obey and support the 
state, and to enjoy the bounty and protection under its banner. Al-Turabi asserts that any 
Islamic government should be stable because Muslims regard it as an expression of their 
faith. Hence, Muslims will do their utmost to contribute positively toward the political 
success of the Islamic state.154   
In Qur’an 22:41 and 3:104, the Islamic state holds regular prayer, gives charity, 
and enjoins good and forbids evil. Qur’an 2:143 states that the Muslim nation is created 
justly balanced in order to become a witness of God to the world. This verse again is the 
foundation of Wasatiyya, epitomizing their vision of an Islamic democracy: A justly 
balanced society guided by a justly balanced government. Thus, an Islamic democracy is 
not only concerned with managing the affairs of the people, it is also tasked to spread the 
word of God throughout humanity and unite the global Muslim Ummah.  
Al-Qaradawi and al-Ghannouchi assert that an Islamic democracy is a civilian 
authority answerable to the people. It is not a theocratic state in the style of the Christian 
monarchies of the Middle Ages, as the concept of the divine right of rulers is unknown to 
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Islam.155 It is a global state, open to all believers and not limited by territorial or ethnic 
boundaries.156 It is bound by divine principles and guidelines, aimed at achieving justice 
and mercy. An Islamic democracy is governed by Shari’ah, a set of broad moral guiding 
principles as opposed to a set of legal codes, which is fair and merciful. Al-Ghannouchi 
states that the guidelines and regulations of Shari’ah together form a framework, which is 
spacious enough to comprise all known fundamental rights such as the right to life, to 
freedom of choice, to education, to owning property, and to participate in public life, and 
in the establishment of a just system of government. Shari’ah provides the precepts to an 
Islamic democratic form of government.157   
Furthermore, an Islamic democracy is based on shura and the consensus of the 
Ummah, codified as a right and responsibility of all Muslims in Qur’an 3:159: “…and 
consult them in the matter and when you reach a decision put your trust in God.” Shura, 
in addition to ijma (consensus of the Ummah), is often likened to the democratic concept 
of participatory or representative government. Hasan al-Turabi insists that an Islamic 
state will flourish because Islam promotes a social environment of freedom and shura.158 
Shura and ijma will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
The constitution of an Islamic democracy must be based on the Qur’an and 
Sunna, mandated in Qur’an 5:44-45, 47, 49–50, which commands the leader 
(government or state) to judge (rule) according to the revelation of God. The leader is not 
the representative of Allah on earth but of the Ummah, though he or she is also God’s 
vice-regent like the rest of the people. The Ummah chooses, supervises, advises, and 
discharges the ruler from his or her office if necessary (evoking the democratic concepts 
election and voting, representative government, and separation of powers).159 In 
accordance with shura, the state listens to the advice of the people, in line with the 
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example of the Prophet who sought his companions’ (sahaba) counsel and opinions as 
commanded by Allah.160 The Ummah, which pledged its trust and confidence (bay’a) on 
the leader, must listen and obey as long as the leader does not order people to disobey 
Allah.161 
Al-Qaradawi expounds on the duties and obligations of an Islamic democracy. 
The state protects the rights of the weak and not the interest of the powerful and strong 
(guaranteeing the democratic rights of non-Muslims and women).162 It is a state of rights 
and responsibilities, reinforced by belief and commitment to the crowning principles of 
Islam. It is the duty of the state to strive for the peace and happiness of every individual. 
The state, according to Qur’an 106:4, is the one “who gave them food in hunger and 
peace in great fear.”163 Most importantly, the Islamic state is a state of principles and 
morality, empowering the people to uphold justice, show mercy, and enjoin good and 
forbid evil (hizbah). In a hadith, the Prophet reportedly said: “Verily Allah is good and 
He accepts only what is good.”164 Thus, an Islamic democracy must be good, and it must 
empower its people to be good.  
Alluding to the principles of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, a beacon of 
democracy celebrated in the modern era, Islam has provided for the inalienable rights to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, by championing, among others, the ideals of 
government by the people, equality, pluralism, freedom and rights, and justice. To 
Wasatiyya, this is what an Islamic democracy is all about. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Wasatiyya presents a solid argument supporting the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy by linking fundamental Islamic principles that equate to the ideals of 
democracy. In today’s context, the centrist movement believes that democracy is the best 
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form of government that can promote the best interest of Islam and the Ummah, which is 
the ultimate goal of the Islamic state in its pursuit of a justly balanced society.165 
Wasatiyya has put forward that conceptually, Islam and democracy can co-exist in the 
form of an Islamic democracy. The next two chapters will assess whether or not the 
elements of democratic regime, democratic governance, and rule of law resonate in an 
Islamic democracy. 
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IV. WASATIYYA VIEWS ON POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND 
GOVERNMENT 
Like democracy, Wasatiyya believes that government obtains its authority and 
legitimacy from the people.166 This chapter identifies and discusses several elements of 
democratic regime and democratic governance in political Islam, which Wasatiyya 
believes demonstrate the undeniable link between Islam and democracy. As a recap, 
democratic regime constitutes access to government offices defined by the 
competiveness, inclusiveness, and fairness of the electoral system and candidate selection 
process. Democratic governance involves the institutional aspects of decision making and 
implementation, and the relations between the powers of government: The executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches.167 This chapter also explores the practical applicability 
of Wasatiyya concepts in real life, as signified in the Wasatiyya-backed Constitution of 
Tunisia after the Arab Spring. The constitution ratified in January 2014 will be utilized in 
this chapter, and all mentions or depictions of Tunisian Constitution in this thesis refer to 
this version only.168 
A. DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Once more, government is an essential requirement to the implementation of the 
comprehensive and multidimensional nature of Islam, and the Wasatiyya Movement 
believes that democracy is the best form of government to achieve this goal.169  It asserts 
that an Islamic democracy is a civilian authority answerable to the people.170 
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1. What the Constitution Says 
The Preamble to the 2014 Constitution of Tunisia clearly states that Tunisia is a 
civil state founded upon a participatory, democratic and republican form of government. 
Sovereignty is retained by the people through peaceful rotation of power via free 
elections, and the principle of separation of powers is guaranteed by the constitution, to 
include the independence of the judiciary. Other elements of democratic regime 
safeguarded by the constitution includes: The right to association based on pluralism; 
neutrality of administration and good governance representing the basis of political 
competition; the supremacy of the law of the land; respect of freedoms and human rights; 
and gender rights, specifically the equality of rights and duties between all male and 
female citizens.  
Moreover, Article 1 declares that Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state 
based on a republican system, whose national religion is Islam and national language is 
Arabic. Article 2 adds that Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the 
people, and the supremacy of the rule of law. 
B. ELECTION AND VOTING  
As discussed in the preceding chapter, electing a leader is an important religious 
duty in Islam.171 Yussuf al-Qaradawi associates the democratic concept of election to a 
candidate’s stamp of approval for fitness in politics, in line with the third foundation of 
the state (vice-regency) on selecting a leader who epitomizes the best and brightest in the 
Ummah.172 It is a validation of the candidate’s credibility, that he or she possesses the 
attributes of a witness required by God.173 Among these attributes are justice, balance 
(fairness) and good reputation.  
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The voters are also commanded by Allah to testify (become a witness), construed 
as they must go to the polling places and exercise their right to vote.174 Rachid al-
Ghannouchi adds that an Islamic democracy promotes open and transparent competition 
for the participation in and control of the government through free and fair elections, 
which must take place in an atmosphere of respect for basic human rights and the 
freedom of speech and assembly.175  
1. What the Constitution Says 
Article 3 of the Constitution of Tunisia declares that sovereignty belongs to the 
people, who are the source of powers, and shall be exercised through their freely elected 
representatives and by referenda. Article 34 specifically safeguards the exercise of 
popular sovereignty. It states that the rights to election, voting, and candidacy are 
guaranteed, in accordance with the law. The state also guarantees the representation of 
women in government. Finally, Article 15 states that government shall serve the interest 
of the public, and shall be governed in accordance with the principles of impartiality, 
equality, transparency, integrity, efficiency and accountability. 
C. MAJORITY RULE 
1. Is Majority Rule Islamic? 
On the democratic concept of majority rule, al-Qaradawi refutes the efforts of 
other Islamists who proclaim that majority rule is not Islamic.176 First, because the 
Qur’an does not mention it, therefore it is automatically not in accordance with Islam. 
They also fear the potential of the majority to violate Islam. The Islamist detractors of 
democracy believe that the majority possesses the potential or inclination to agree upon 
laws and issues that could harm the Ummah and disrespect Islam. This is a pessimistic 
outlook of people, whom God created as his vice-regents.177  
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The opponents of democracy cite literal texts in the Qur’an which states that the 
majority is always on the side of wrong and deceit, and the minority on the other.178 Texts 
on the negative view of majority rule include Qur’an 6:116 (most of the people will lead 
Muslims astray); Qur’an 12:103 and 11:17 (most of the people will not and do not 
believe); Qur’an 7:187 (most of the people do not know); Qur’an 29:63 (most of the 
people do not understand); and Qur’an 2:243 (most of the people are ungrateful). On the 
minority, they cite Qur’an 34:13 (few of My servants are thankful) and Qur’an 38:24 
(the believers and righteous are few). It is clear that the opponents of the democratic 
concept of majority rule do not accept the possibility that democracy will ever be 
implemented in Muslim societies.  
To al-Qaradawi, common sense dictates that the majority opinion has the highest 
probability of being correct because it outnumbers the opinion of the minority. Again, the 
caveat is that even if ninety-nine percent of Muslims agrees on evil and other issues that 
violate Islam, that vote is invalid. The act of Muslims voting for evil is a symptom of the 
Ummah straying from the righteous path of Islam.179 The concept of majority rule should 
not be penalized based on its potential for wrongdoing. What must be highlighted is the 
concept of the vice-regency of man, who, through Islam, is obliged and empowered to 
uphold justice, mercy and the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil. This propensity of 
the Ummah to do what is right is validated by the Prophet in a hadith when he said that, 
“Never will Allah make my Ummah agree on a wrong course,” or “My Community will 
not agree upon an error.”180 
2. What the Constitution Says 
Article 64 of the Tunisian Constitution depicts majority rule in action. It declares 
that all organic legislations in the Chamber of the People’s Deputies must be drafted by 
an absolute majority of its members, while requiring only a majority of the members 
present for drafting normal or ordinary laws. Furthermore, Article 75 exemplifies 
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majority rule in elections, stating that the President shall be elected by means of an 
absolute majority of valid votes. The article also states that if an absolute majority of 
votes is not achieved by a single candidate, a second round of presidential election shall 
be organized until a majority is achieved.  
D. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
Representative or participatory government is one of the most distinguishable 
aspects of democracy. It is the delegation of power by the people to their elected or 
chosen representatives in government. Simply put, the people are giving their consent, by 
voting or electing, to the government to fulfill and guarantee their will. In this age of 
large population centers and countries, it is no longer practical for people to simply get 
together in an assembly or town hall setting to discuss matters and vote on them directly, 
especially those issues that span the entire state or province, or the entire country as a 
whole.181  
Representative government also provides for the stability and continuity in 
government, as government or politicians are less likely to reflect the transitory political 
passions of the moment than are the people.182 According to John Stuart Mill, the role of 
representative government is “to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and 
a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and 
small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their 
support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who 
appoint those by whom it is conducted.”183 
1. The Institution of Shura and Ijma 
In Islam, representative government is exemplified by the concepts of shura 
(mutual consultation) and ijma (consensus of the Ummah, and later consensus of the 
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ulama). In essence, shura is derived from ijma. This select body of the most capable 
representatives of the people tasked with mutual consultation is chosen via the consensus 
of the Ummah. Shura affirms that the ruler must seek the advice of the people, and the 
people must advice the ruler. The relationship between the ruler and the governed is a 
covenant that God commands His believers to honor, comparable to the democratic social 
contract guaranteed by the constitution (Qur’an 16:19). To honor the covenant is to honor 
God Himself. Many assert that the gradual decline of Muslims after the Golden Age of 
Islam is attributed to the breakdown of this covenant, when both rulers and citizens 
neglect their obligation to shura and ijma.184 
The institution of shura in Islam has become one of the crowning achievements of 
Muslim political tradition. God commanded the Prophet to consult and deliberate with his 
people in Qur’an 42:38. Because the Prophet had to consult and deliberate with his 
people concerning societal affairs, the caliphs that succeeded him must also honor shura. 
All the Rightly-Guided Caliphs were chosen through shura and the consensus of the 
Ummah. Thus, shura came to be known as the people who chose the ruler (ahl al-’aqd). 
Shura applies to both the ruler and the governed. The ruler must actively seek the advice 
of the ahl al-shura (people of consultation) and the ahl al-shura must advise and 
deliberate with the ruler.185  
The responsibility of shura also goes deeper in the sense that both rulers and the 
people of consultation must actively resist despotism (al-istibdad) and autocratic rule (al-
hukm bi’l hawa al-tasallut), all forms of repressive government. The result of the shura’s 
deliberation is either binding (shura mulzima) or non-binding (ghayr mulzima) to the 
ruler, but the consensus among the early jurist was that it is mostly not compulsory.186 
Again, this neglect of the institution of shura is among the top issues that caused the 
decline of Muslims in the modern age.187 
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Shura has become one of the Islamic concepts viewed as inherently compatible to 
the democratic value of representative government. And as discussed earlier, the issue of 
majority rule overwhelms the compatibility argument: Will the majority always do the 
right thing, or will it undermine the laws of God? As with Shari’ah and the limits 
imposed on government power, the same logic of potential for abuse applies to shura. 
Shura has the potential to undermine public good and individual rights and freedom when 
unchecked by the overarching moral principles of Islam. As stated earlier, it is clear that 
moral principles must be applied to everything, starting with the process itself and the 
resulting product.188 The process of mutual consultation and deliberation must be bound 
by Islamic principles. This will make certain that the outcome, whether binding or non-
binding, is morally sound and in accordance with the highest Islamic values. 
2. Preferred Form of Government 
Wasatiyya argues that a parliamentary189 form of representative government is the 
most effective institution for enabling the public to participate in the drafting of laws in 
those areas where Shari’ah is silent. Al-Qaradawi observes that parliament may legislate 
“in any area where multiple opinions are possible.” The range of topics is vast: From 
traffic laws and taxation, to the decision to wage war. He notes that they borrow these 
institutions from Western democracies.190   
However, he stresses that this borrowing is done in a highly selective manner. Al-
Qaradawi’s view is typical when he writes that the Islamic world must “take the best 
elements of democracy without seeking to duplicate it.” The central goals of an Islamic 
state are to enhance justice and oppose tyranny. At this moment in history, democratic 
institutions are the best means for achieving these goals and, thus, democracy “is the 
form of government that is closest to Islam.” However, democracy in an Islamic context 
must operate within the ethical framework defined by Shari’ah. It must not lead to laws 
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that allow what is forbidden in Islam (such as adultery or alcohol consumption) or 
prohibit what is required (such as prayer, zakat, or pilgrimage).191 
3. What the Constitution Says 
As mentioned earlier, Article 3 of the Tunisian Constitution declares that 
sovereignty belongs to the people, who are the source of powers, and shall be exercised 
through their freely elected representatives and by referendum. Article 50 states that the 
people exercises legislative power through their representatives in the Chamber of the 
People’s Deputies or through referenda. 
E. PLURALISM AND THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM  
When it comes to the concept of multiparty system in Islam, the establishment of 
organizations that are transparent and able to aid the ruler and replace him if necessary 
serves the best interest of the faith and the nation.192 Multiparty system exemplifies the 
pluralism and opposition inherent in Islam, as evident in the evolution of the four schools 
of fiqh (Sunni Islamic jurisprudence: Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi’i) and the 
division of the faith in Sunni, Shia, and Sufi sects, among others. It also highlights the 
prominence of freedom and rights in Islam, including diversity in opinion that could only 
serve to advance the best interest of the Ummah if conducted in an Islamic way.193 
Qur’an 30:22 affirms that diversity is in all of creation, languages and colors and lead to 
the diversity of men of knowledge.194  
1. Is the Multiparty System Islamic? 
According to al-Qaradawi, there is nothing in the Qur’an that prohibits a 
multiparty system in politics. Hassan al-Turabi concurs that there is no legal restriction to 
establishing political parties because it as an expression of freedom of opinion and 
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debate, both of which are celebrated in Islam.195 As a matter of opinion, multiple parties 
serve the best interest of Islam and the Ummah in combating oppression and 
despotism.196 The requirement for multiparty system is two-fold: Parties must profess that 
Islam is the creed and law of the land, regardless of their opposing views; and parties 
must not work with hostile forces against Islam and the Ummah. Parties that organize 
with an aim of increasing personal wealth and glory are prohibited. Parties cannot 
deceive the people to do wrong, and partisanship based on bigotry is haram (not 
permissible).197  
Islam celebrates human diversity. Allah intentionally created humanity unique 
from each other (Qur’an 11:118), and from a single man and woman, and grouped them 
into races and tribes so that they would come to know one another (Qur’an 49:13). These 
Qur’anic verses form the foundation for the Islamic principles of pluralism and diversity, 
and most importantly, social cooperation and mutual assistance to achieve justice.198 
Recognizing diversity also translates to tolerance of differences, which also entails the 
institution of safeguards that protect diversity. 
Despite the Qur’an’s celebration of diversity, the cynics of multiparty system 
continue to insist that it is not indigenous to Islam. Again, al-Qaradawi reiterates that 
there is nothing wrong with borrowing from non-Muslim traditions as long as it serves 
the best interest of the Ummah and they make the product their own. Citing the example 
of the Prophet and his companions once more, al-Qaradawi points out cases that 
legitimize borrowing: The time when the Prophet dug a trench around Medina to prevent 
the enemy from overrunning the city; when the Prophet had a seal made to affix in his 
letter because other rulers did not read correspondence without official seals; when the 
Caliph Umar adopted a system of land tax and accounting for the treasury; and when 
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Mu’awiyah borrowed a foreign mail system.199 The other concern is that Islam values 
unity in everything, thus, the concept of diversity as embodied by the multiparty system 
may seem threatening for Muslims. Al-Qaradawi affirms that there are different forces 
and groups in life that submit to Islam in spite of their diversity.200  
For Tarik al-Bishri, another proponent of Wasatiyya and one of the foremost legal 
authorities in Egypt, multiple parties reflect the varied interests that naturally emerge in 
society. Social order and harmony require that these interests be given expression through 
parties, as well as other institutions of civil society.201 Muhammad Salim al-Awwa adds 
that the presence of multiple parties reflects the principle of tolerance of dissent 
(opposition), which he considers fundamental to the faith. He notes that the Caliph Ali 
tolerated the Kharijites,202 despite their sharp differences with him. He proposes that God 
intentionally created differing groups and views in order to better to serve His will. He 
concludes that, “The existence of political parties ... is necessary for the advancement [of 
Islamic societies] and for freedom of opinion within them, and to ensure the absence of 
oppression.”203 
2. What the Constitution Says 
The Preamble to the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the right to association 
based on pluralism, neutrality of administration and good governance representing the 
basis of political competition. Article 35 guarantees the freedom to establish political 
parties, unions and associations. Furthermore, Article 60 celebrates the role of the 
opposition, stating that it is an integral element of the legislative branch with rights to 
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adequately perform their legislative duties. The opposition is expected to actively and 
constructively contribute in parliament. 
F. SEPARATION OF POWERS 204 
According to the United States National Archive, Americans are strongly 
committed to the democratic concept that the best way to safeguard against tyranny is via 
the separation of the three powers of government: The executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. Each branch is expected to check and balance the power of the other two.205 
According to the philosopher John Locke, while the legislative branch formulates and 
enacts laws, the executive branch enforces them through rules and regulations. In terms 
of their functions, Locke believes that the legislative branch is superior to the executive 
because naturally, “what can give laws to another, must [be] and needs [to] be superior to 
him.”206 Baron de Montesquieu, one of the most influential political thinkers of his time, 
builds on Locke’s ideas, but emphasizes the crucial role of the judiciary to interpret the 
constitutionality of laws.207   
The prevention of tyranny is one of the primary reasons why Wasatiyya 
subscribes to the democratic concept of separation and balance of powers. According to 
al-Qaradawi, Islam attacks tyrants who pretend to rule in God’s name. Resisting tyranny 
is an Islamic obligation.208 The democratic concept of separation of powers is celebrated 
in Islam through the sacred covenant between God, the state and the people. To reiterate, 
shura affirms that the ruler must seek the advice of the people, and in turn the people 
must advice the ruler. This section also shows that provisions of separation of powers in 
government are codified in the Constitutions of Tunisia. 
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In the spirit of transparency, it is important to reemphasize the fact that the 
Prophet Muhammad was recognized as head of state, religious leader, and giver, 
enforcer, and interpreter of laws at the same time during the Golden Age of Islam, which 
many detractors of the compatibility of Islam and democracy cite as a major issue. To 
Wasatiyya, the Prophet was able to become leader of Islam and the state simultaneously 
because the word of God was revealed to him directly, which entitles the Prophet to 
assume both roles and responsibilities. The caliphs and leaders that succeeded the 
Prophet did not enjoy the same distinction, therefore they were not qualified to assume 
both roles as did the final Messenger of God.209 
1. What the Constitution Says 
The Constitution of Tunisia provides for the organization of the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government. Article 71 invests executive powers to 
the President of the Republic and the government headed by the Prime Minister (Article 
89). The President is also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces (Article 77). The 
President is the head of state according to Article 72, and Article 75 limits him or her to 
only two 5-year terms. In Article 77, the President can dissolve the Chamber of People’s 
Deputies after a vote of no-confidence. 
Article 50 invests legislative power to the unicameral congress of the Chamber of 
the People’s Deputies. International treaties must be ratified by the chamber (Article 67), 
and declaration of war and peace must be approved by a three-fifths majority (Article 
77). Furthermore, Article 88 allows for impeachment proceedings against the President 
for violations against the constitution by two-thirds of the Chamber of the People’s 
Deputies. Article 89 states that the government must submit its program to the chamber 
for approval, as Article 95 decrees that the government is accountable before the 
chamber. 
Finally, Article 102 of the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the independence of 
the judicial branch of government. Judges are appointed by the executive branch, upon 
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the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council (Article 112 establishes the 
mandate and membership of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is both an elected and 
appointed body). Most importantly, Article 109 prohibits any interference with the 
judiciary. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter clearly shows that the basic elements of democracy are intrinsic to 
Islam, furthering Wasatiyya’s claim that both are truly harmonious with each other. 
Popular sovereignty is at the core of Islamic political traditions, from the elements of 
election, majority rule and representative government, to the multiparty system and the 
separation of powers. This conceptual undertaking is further complemented by real-world 
instances from the Constitution of Tunisia, highlighting the fact that elements of 
democratic regime and democratic governance are indeed inherent in Wasatiyya’s vision 
of an Islamic democracy. The next chapter examines the element of the rule of law in 
political Islam through Wasatiyya’s views on freedom and rights. 
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V. WASATIYYA VIEWS ON FREEDOM AND RIGHTS 
This chapter explores Wasatiyya views on freedom and rights, to include their 
foundations and evidence in the early period of the religion, culminating with discussions 
in minority rights, women’s rights, and other specific freedoms and rights celebrated by 
the democratic concept. Wasatiyya claims that Islam celebrates the concept of the rule of 
law founded upon freedom and rights that is essential to democracy, to prove that indeed, 
Islam and democracy can co-exist.210 To reiterate, the rule of law constitutes government 
treatment of its citizens defined by human and civil rights, levels of corruption, and 
freedom of expression.211 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREEDOM AND RIGHTS 
The tandem of freedom and rights represents one of the most important capstones 
of democracy. Freedom is defined as “the quality or state of being free: The absence of 
necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action.”212 Rights is defined as a moral or 
legal entitlement to have or do something. The relationship between the two concepts lies 
in the belief that “to accept a set of rights is to approve a distribution of freedom and 
authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may, must, and must not be done.”213 
Thus, freedom and rights are intrinsically intertwined with authority, 
responsibility and a normative sense of justice and morality, all cornerstones of Islam 
which correspond to democratic ideals. Government by the people is made possible by 
the recognition that each and every one is endowed with the inherent freedom and right to 
exist, and that freedom and rights are to be protected and preserved by the government 
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which the people have chosen. The guarantee of freedom and rights provides the basis of 
rule of law which is crucial to democracy. 
B. FREEDOM AND RIGHTS IN ISLAM 
The foundation of freedom and rights in Islam is codified in Qur’an 2:256, “There 
is no compulsion in religion,” and Qur’an 10:99, “As for you, will you force men to 
become believers?” Hasan al-Turabi asserts that Islam is based on genuine conviction and 
voluntary compliance.214 Since Islam is a comprehensive way of life, these passages do 
not only pertain to “religion” per se, but no compulsion in all facets of life. In theory, no 
one can compel another to do what he or she does not want to do according to his or her 
own conscience. Therefore, consent is at the heart of this discussion. Qur’an 88:22 
further adds that only God has the authority over man: “You are not in authority over 
their conscience.” For Muslims, Allah, the sole authority over man and everything else, 
has endowed each and every person with free will as His vice-regent. With the 
responsibility of being God’s vice-regent come the God-given freedom and rights that 
can neither be violated nor taken away.  
Khaled Abou El Fadl states that freedom and human rights constitute human 
interests, and there are certain inalienable rights or interests that when violated result in 
the loss of personal worth or dignity.215 These rights include the right against being 
tortured and entitlement to basic needs such as food, shelter and the means to obtain them 
(employment, social services, etc.). Rachid al-Ghannouchi expounds that freedom and 
rights are understood as the interests of the people, stating that the objective of Islam is to 
realize the main interest of mankind.216 Muhammad Salim al-Awwa concludes that 
freedom to voice one’s opinion or assert one’s difference or diversity is not only a legal 
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right but a constitutionally-protected requirement.217 Recognizing and respecting 
freedom and rights are Islamic rites which transcend their mere preservation: It becomes 
a duty and obligation for every Muslim, man or woman.218 As Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
succinctly puts it, faith with free will and conviction is honored in Islam.219  
1. Positive Freedom 
Al-Ghannouchi subscribes to the concept of positive freedom, in which the 
individual decides for him or herself what to do and what not to do, instead of being 
forced or influenced by others. He asserts that freedom should be construed as the 
“freedom to” rather than “freedom from,” a concept prevalent in Western liberal thought. 
Al-Ghannouchi pays special emphasis on man’s personal struggle between reason and 
passion, which is more important than any other external factor that can restrict freedom. 
He believes that ultimately, servitude to God is the only road to freedom. Allah’s 
revelation gave man freedom: Every person exists to be free, and the closer he or she gets 
to God, the freer he or she becomes.220 
Thus, to be free is a constant personal struggle, as being true to God is a lifelong 
journey. In serving God, man is freed from the influence of all internal and external 
factors. Pertinent to this argument, it is crucial to point out a key exception to freedom of 
choice in Islam: Muslims are not allowed to convert from Islam (apostasy), as it is 
specifically prohibited in the Qur’an, although no specific penalty is prescribed.221 
Though this may be construed as incongruous to democratic ideals of freedom and rights 
as envisioned in the West, apostasy is not an issue for Muslims because it is part of their 
total identity as the Islamic Ummah. A true witness of God struggles to remain a believer, 
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and God’s grace gives man the wisdom and courage to continue along the righteous path. 
Apostasy is among the areas of contention further discussed in the concluding chapter. 
2. Freedom and Rights in Early Islam 
There are plenty of evidence which demonstrates freedom and human rights in 
pre-Modern Islam. The jurists preserved the welfare of people by codifying laws that 
forbade actions that violated the basic necessities of religion, intellect, life, lineage or 
honor, and property. Early Muslims were proponents of the concept of presumption of 
innocence, which asserts that the accuser has the burden of proof.222   
In cases of heresy, jurists believe that it is better to let a thousand heretics go free 
than to punish the single sincere innocent. The same applies with crimes, where it is 
better to release a guilty person than to punish the innocent. The practice of imprisoning 
groups who openly preach their different views is condemned, along with harassing the 
opponent until they actually carry arms and openly declare their intent to rebel. Jurists 
also condemned the use of torture and mutilation. They also condemned the use of 
coerced statements or confessions. Judges who rely on coerced confession are 
committing injustice, and forms of redress against grievances by judges and by extension, 
the government, were guaranteed.223 
Today, Wasatiyya believes that besides the right to life, dignity, and property, 
everyone is entitled to security, sufficiency, consultation (representation), freedom, 
equality, and the accountability of the state.224 Al-Awwa points out that freedom of 
choice holds a significant importance in Islam. He states that Adam was endowed with 
free will by God: He had the choice to obey or not obey Allah. Hence, the freedom to 
choose is a natural, God-given aspect of humanity. This is sanctified in the Qur’an, 
which guarantees that the choice to submit or not to submit to the will of God is man’s 
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alone. The freedom and the right to choose is therefore a fundamental Islamic 
principle.225 
Wasatiyya also believes that it is the duty and obligation of every Muslim to 
exercise ijtihad, understood as a personal struggle to understand Islam. This struggle 
requires reason, reflection, and dialogue with fellow believers. As a consequence, 
freedom of thought, inquiry, and speech are essential to the full expression of Muslim 
faith.226 In addition, al-Awwa advices that each Muslim bears an obligation to enjoin 
good and forbid evil within the community. In order to fulfill this obligation, each 
Muslim must be free to speak out against evil and corruption. Speaking out in this 
manner is a religious duty and, thus, freedom of speech is divinely sanctioned and 
mandated.227  
C. THE RIGHTS OF NON-MUSLIMS 
The rights of non-Muslim minorities in Muslim societies have varied over time 
and place. Although the Constitution of Medina guaranteed and protected the rights of 
dhimmis (The People of the Book (ahl-al-kitab), Jews and Christians whom God 
previously revealed His message) in return for submission to Muslim rule, in practice 
their treatment was mostly dependent upon political and economic factors that benefitted 
the Ummah. There are historical cases recording violations of minority rights, but they 
were always viewed as ethically, morally and legally against Islamic law and 
traditions.228 Non-Muslims were guaranteed the right to practice their faith freely, which 
even includes criticizing Islam and engaging in debates and dialogues with Muslims. 
Other minority freedom and rights include: Autonomy in the regulation of their private 
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and family life; the right to education; and the right to be absolved from Islamic laws 
which they deem incompatible to their faith.229 Consequently, Muslims are required by 
Islam to treat non-Muslims with respect, trust and benevolence.230    
According to Hasan al-Banna, Islam does not only command the protection of the 
minority; it also requires benevolence and doing of good on their behalf. To him, Islam’s 
celebration of minority rights is evident in Qur’an 60:8, “Allah does not forbid you from 
those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - 
from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves 
those who act justly.” This verse is often used to exemplify the fair treatment of non-
Muslim minorities in Muslim nations, in addition to Qur’an 49:13, which celebrates 
human diversity and social cooperation.231 
1. Citizenship 
For Wasatiyya, citizenship is a key concept when describing freedom and rights in 
Islam, including the rights of the non-Muslim minority groups. Al-Ghannouchi 
differentiates between two types of citizenship rights in the Ummah: Unqualified and 
qualified. He attributes this as a result of the freedom of choice accorded to every 
individual, Muslim or non-Muslim. Every person has the choice to embrace and abide by 
Islam or not. Those who embrace Islam are considered “unqualified” citizens, enjoying 
all the freedoms accorded to a Muslim. Citizens who do not choose to embrace Islam as 
their faith are free to do so, for there is no compulsion in Islam. But they are required to 
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pledge their allegiance (bay’a) to the state; only then could they become “qualified” 
citizens. They have to convert to Islam in order to become unqualified citizens.232  
There are specific limits imposed on qualified citizens, specifically concerning 
issues that directly bear on the identity of the Muslim nation. These include not allowing 
non-Muslims to hold senior positions in government. Many cite that allegiance to non-
Muslims is prohibited in Qur’an 3:28 and 4:138-139. But this applies because their 
religion is not Islam: Muslims must pay allegiance only to the Ummah.233 It is clear that 
dhimmi status involves important restrictions on activities and a second-class standing in 
terms of political structures. However, it is also clear that the minorities were formally 
recognized as legitimate participants in Muslim societies with real rights and protections 
from persecution.234 
2. Celebrating the Rights of Non-Muslims 
When recommending judicial remedy for a persecuted Copt, the Caliph Umar 
remarked on freedom (of religion) when asking, “How could you enslave people when 
they were born free?”  In doing so, Umar emphasized the people’s freedom and right to 
dignity and to equality before the law regardless of differences in faith.235 He also 
emphasized minority rights in a Muslim-majority nation. Islam contains a formal 
recognition of the special rights of dhimmis. The People of the Book, under the protection 
of Muslims, were granted freedom and tolerance, including the consumption of alcohol 
and food that Islam forbids.236 Al-Qaradawi regards the violation of the freedom and 
rights of non-Muslims in the Ummah as worse than the violation of Muslim freedom and 
rights.237 
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Since the Muslim majority is in a much stronger position than the non-Muslim 
minority, Qur’an 59:7 mandates the protection of the rights of the weak against the 
interest of the strong. For instance, zakat (almsgiving or charity, one of the five pillars of 
Islam) is imposed among the rich to compensate for the poor, “In order that it may not be 
a circuit between the wealthy among you.”238 Caliph Abu Bakr reinforced this by stating 
that, “the powerful among you will be the most feeble with me till I take from him the 
due right, and the most feeble among you will be the most powerful till I restore him his 
right again.” Muslims believe that one of the most important principles of Islam is that all 
things belong to God and, therefore, wealth is held by human beings in trust.239 
Islam not only commands Muslims to protect the weak, but also to fight to free 
them all (Qur’an 4:75). According to a hadith, when the Caliph Umar was informed that 
his commander in Africa could not find a single person to give charity to, he ordered to 
purchase slaves and set them free. According to another hadith, the Prophet is reported 
saying, “Allah never sanctifies a nation in which right is not established and the feeble 
receives not his from the powerful with neither hardship nor harm.”240 Here, Islam 
seamlessly integrates freedom and rights with equality, charity and mercy.  
Wasatiyya advocates for the protection of the freedom and rights of non-Muslims. 
Its proponents argue that differences in religion were created by God and, as such, should 
be respected and protected. For instance, Tarik al-Bishri argues that Egypt’s unique 
historical experience has produced a national identity that embraces both Muslims and 
Copts. Islam is part of this Egyptian identity, but it does not dominate it and does not 
define Copts as second-class citizens. A strengthening of Islam’s role in society need not 
threaten Copts, so long as the country’s shared Egyptian identity is preserved.241  Al-
Awwa concurs, and proposes that sectarian strife has risen in recent years because of 
political opportunism by trouble makers on both sides. These tensions do not reflect any 
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fundamental incompatibility between Muslims and Copts, and can be resolved through 
dialogue and popular action.242 
Al-Qaradawi similarly writes that Muslims and Copts constitute a shared national 
brotherhood that is grounded in respect and tolerance. He argues that Copts are equal to 
Muslims before the law on civil matters, and that they are entitled to practice their own 
laws on matters of creed, worship, and personal status. Copts may also hold senior 
positions in government, serve in the bureaucracy, and participate in parliament. 
However, the post of President must always be held by a Muslim in order to ensure that 
the state remains Islamic. For the same reason, Muslims must also hold a majority in 
parliament.243 There is no legal basis to exclude Copts from being elected in the Shura 
Council, but the majority of the council must be comprised of Muslims, as the Muslim 
identity and religion must be preserved.244  
3. What the Constitution Says 
Although Article 1 of the Constitution of Tunisia clearly declares that the state 
religion is Islam, it also protects all religions and guarantees freedom of belief, 
conscience and religious practice. Mosques and churches are considered neutral grounds, 
and the state is prohibited from using them to influence people. Tunisia also promotes 
values of moderation and tolerance. In this age of religious extremism, Article 6 of the 
constitution prohibits unfounded and malicious charges or attacks of apostasy (calling 
others takfir or unbelievers) and other methods that incite hatred and violence. 
D. WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Qur’an 4:1 clearly highlights the equality of men and women: “O mankind! Be 
careful of your duty to your Lord Who created you from a single soul and from it created 
its mate and from them twain hath spread abroad a multitude of men and women. Be 
careful of your duty toward Allah in Whom ye claim (your rights) of one another, and 
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toward the wombs (that bare you). Lo! Allah hath been a watcher over you.”245 Men and 
women are equal both in terms of their creation and their relation to each other as 
commanded by God. One could even argue that women are venerated in this verse as 
mothers.246  
The rights of women are also protected in Qur’an 4:19, where Allah forbids men 
to inherit women against their will and commands the treatment of women with kindness 
and fairness. When Allah commands Muslims to enjoin good and forbid evil, women are 
mentioned in equal footing. Other passages in the Qur’an that exemplify women’s rights 
include: “Every soul will be (held) in pledge for its deeds” (Qur’an 74:38); “So their 
Lord accepted their prayers, (saying): I will not suffer to be lost the work of any of you 
whether male or female. You proceed one from another” (Qur’an 3: 195); and “Whoever 
works righteousness, man or woman, and has faith, verily to him (or her) will We give a 
new life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to 
their actions.” (Qur’an 16:97, 4:124).247 
1. Championing Women’s Rights 
In its early stages, Islam ushered major changes that championed the status of 
women in the Arab World. It condemned the practice of female infanticide and 
recognized the full status or personhood of women in society. Islam codified the 
contractual nature of marriage, and secured women’s right to inherit, own and manage 
property. History indicates that Muhammad sought and valued the counsel of women, 
reportedly even appointing Waraqah as imam (religious leader) over her household. 
Women were originally unsegregated from men during prayers in mosques, and as 
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mothers and teachers were instrumental to the preservation and transmission of hadiths 
and Islamic traditions to generations of Muslims.248 
Women were active and accomplished members of early Islamic society. They 
freely participated in commerce and trade. The Caliph Umar appointed women to serve 
as officials in the Medina markets. According to historical records, the first person to 
submit to the Prophet’s call (Khadijah) and the first martyr of Islam (Summayah) are both 
women. Women fought side by side with the Prophet during several battles during his 
time. Aishah, the Prophet’s wife, was a respected authority in medicine, history, and 
public speaking. Women in the Prophet’s household were relatively autonomous in early 
Islam. Women who pledged allegiance to the Messenger were considered independent of 
their male relatives in the Qur’an, and records show that women converted to Islam even 
before their husbands, all proofs of female independence and action.249 
2. The Perceived Decline of Women’s Rights in Muslim Society 
So what happened? Based on prevailing Western views, why has the status or role 
of women become miniscule and secondary in contemporary Muslim societies? As with 
any religion, the cultural norms and traditions of the land, particularly Arabia, have a lot 
to do with how religion came to justify methods that gradually curtailed the freedom and 
rights of women. Many practices and laws that restrict women’s rights evolved to 
correspond with the domination of men in politics (patriarchal society) and the highly 
conservative view of how women should behave and interact in society. Many things that 
women were able to do and excel in the early age of Islam are now equated to 
ungodliness or impropriety. Again, and this is not limited to Islam, religion has been 
interpreted and used to restrict the freedom and rights of women over centuries.250  
There are several issues about women’s rights and roles in the Islamic community 
that are considered highly contentious. Many believe that women are equal to men, 
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except in certain circumstances. For instance, many Muslims think that a woman enjoys 
the protection of the man in the home, hence, they belong at home and not in the public 
realm. But many also claim that guardianship and superiority of man over women are 
confined in marriage, wherein the man is the breadwinner (Qur’an 4:34). If there 
responsibility in the home is fulfilled (e.g., when the children have already left the home, 
the husband died, etc., all being very subjective), she can gradually move on to civil 
activities and so on. Others still subscribe to the belief that there are laws restricting the 
inheritance of a woman to half that of a man, or that a man’s testimony is equivalent to 
the testimony of two women in court.251   
Moreover, many Muslims still subscribe to the idea that women cannot hold the 
highest post in the state, because of two sources. First, a hadith reportedly states that 
women cannot be leaders of the affairs of the people, because people who choose women 
to manage their affairs will gain no success. Second, they interpret Qur’an 2:228 (Men 
are over women and a degree above them, though they share the same rights) as women 
cannot rule over man. To this effect, they believe that the number of women running for 
the Shura Council is limited, so as to prevent the domination of women in the forum. 
These references to the Qur’an and Islamic traditions are of course subject to 
human interpretation and the period when they were interpreted. The interpretation may 
have been relevant then, but is it relevant now? Anyone can quote the Qur’an or the 
Bible and either interpret it literally word for word, or give a balanced understanding that 
is most appropriate to the current political context or reality, as Wasatiyya espouses.  
Al-Qaradawi asserts that men and women are equal in the eyes of God. They have 
the same duties and responsibilities as members of the Ummah, which includes adherence 
to the Five Pillars of Islam (the profession of faith that there is no God but God, pray five 
times a day, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca). To exclude women from 
participation in public life is to violate their freedom and rights guaranteed by Allah. 
Hence, women have the freedom and right to vote and to hold public office.252 There is 
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no legal proof that prohibits women from working in the judiciary and the Shura Council. 
In this day and age, it is outdated to think that women ought to confine themselves in 
only the affairs of the home. Many women have risen to the highest positions in Muslim 
countries in contemporary times. Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan and Tansu Ciller of Turkey 
were Prime Ministers in the 1990s, while Sheik Hasina has been the Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh since 1996. As Qur’an 3:195 and a hadith states, women are sisters of men, 
confirming their equality.253 
3. What the Constitution Says 
The Preamble to the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the equality of rights and 
duties between all male and female citizens. Article 21 declares that all citizens, male and 
female alike, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any 
discrimination. The state guarantees all citizens, male and female, individual and 
collective rights and a life of dignity. Article 34 guarantees the representation of women 
in elected councils, and Article 74 guarantees that women can be elected as President, as 
long as they are Tunisian-born and Muslim in faith. Furthermore, Article 40 guarantees 
women’s employment rights. Finally, Article 46 guarantees the protection of women’s 
rights, protection against violence, and their equal opportunity with men. 
E. ON SPECIFIC FREEDOM AND RIGHTS  
This section focuses on what the Constitution of Tunisia says on other freedoms 
and rights that are essential to the democratic system. Article 49 of the Tunisian 
Constitution prohibits amendments that undermine the freedom and human rights 
guaranteed by the constitution. 
1. Freedom of Expression and Free Press 
Article 31 of the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the freedom of opinion, 
thought, expression, media and publication. Article 32 guarantees the right to information 
and the right to access information. The state works to guarantee access to 
communications networks. Article 41 guarantees the right to culture and creativity. The 
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state encourages cultural creativity and support national culture in its authenticity, 
diversity and renewal, in so as far as it promotes the values of tolerance, rejection of 
violence and an openness to different cultures and a dialogue between civilizations.  
2. Peaceful Assembly and Civic Activism  
Article 35 of the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the freedom to establish 
political parties, unions, and associations. Parties, unions and associations must abide, in 
their internal charters and activities, by the constitution, the law, financial transparency 
and the rejection of violence. Article 37 guarantees the right to peaceful assembly and 
demonstration.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Wasatiyya demonstrates that the democratic element of the rule of law as 
exemplified by freedom and rights are embedded in Islamic principles and heritage and 
enshrined in the Constitution of the Tunisian Republic. Upholding justice, tolerance and 
mercy celebrates and protects diversity, and justice will never be achieved until everyone 
acknowledges that diversity constitutes the freedom and rights of every man and woman. 
But it is also clear that, even in the most advanced democracies, freedom and rights are 
not always guaranteed and protected at all cost, despite the guiding principles provided 
by organized religion, whether it be Christianity, Judaism or Islam. This is important to 
emphasize because democracy and other forms of government are often based on 
religious ideologies, regardless of their best efforts to organize the state under civilian or 
secular foundations. So the challenge lies in the recognition that freedom and human 
rights exist, that people possess these rights, and that they are entitled and protected by 
God to enjoy these rights.254 Acknowledging these key ideas opens the dynamic link 
between Islam and democracy.  
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VI. WASATIYYA: IMPLICATIONS ON DEMOCRACY IN THE 
MUSLIM WORLD  
A. IS WASATIYYA DEMOCRATIC? 
Wasatiyya clearly shows that Islam and democracy celebrate a multitude of 
comparable values and principles, from popular sovereignty, majority rule, representative 
government, and the multiparty system, to the separation and alternation of powers and 
the rule of law as exemplified by freedom and universal human rights. Wasatiyya also 
shows that the foundations of the Islamic state celebrate the fundamental concepts of the 
democratic system, as exemplified by its vision of an Islamic democracy.255 So at a 
minimum, the proponents of Wasatiyya have successfully conceptualized how Islam and 
democracy can coexist and transform into a reality given the right circumstances. They 
strongly believe that democracy can promote the best interest of Islam and the global 
Ummah by empowering the faithful and combating the tyranny of oppressive rule that 
has mired the Muslim World. Therefore, this thesis concludes that Wasatiyya is indeed 
democratic.  
But the bigger question is: How democratic is Wasatiyya? Several exceptions or 
areas of contention will be pointed out here to illustrate the varying degrees of 
Wasatiyya’s commitment to the contemporary democratic concept while preserving the 
essence of Islamic principles. The centrist movement accomplishes this by advocating a 
balanced perspective. The bottom line is that an Islamic democracy constitutes a state of 
believers: People who govern and are governed by the highest standards of Islamic 
morality and principles. The promotion of justice and balance is a recurring theme in this 
thesis: It is the heart and soul of the Wasatiyya Movement. In this case, Wasatiyya 
unequivocally views democracy as a powerful instrument towards achieving justice and 
balance in the Islamic Ummah.  
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Overall, the Islamic principle of Wasatiyya has met the minimum requirements 
utilized by this thesis to be considered as somewhat, if not very, democratic. Their notion 
of an Islamic democracy constitutes elements of sound democratic regime, democratic 
governance, and the rule of law. And in actual application, this notion is backed by the 
Constitution of the Tunisian Republic. Again, Wasatiyya sees the issue of Islam and 
democracy as a product of historical struggle within Islam to fit with modernity. The 
ideological dimension is one of many facets of Muslims adjusting to a modern world 
shaped by Western innovations, institutions, and ideas.256 Therefore, rather than being a 
mere pragmatic adjustment to amass popular support, it is actually a long-term historical 
rethinking of the role of Islam in modernity.257  
B. AREAS OF CONTENTION 
This section highlights several areas of contention that continue to fuel 
disagreements in the Islam-democracy debate. It is crucial to note that although tensions 
may exist in the way Wasatiyya conceptually defends these controversial Islamic views, 
the Constitution of the Tunisian Republic undoubtedly nullifies these concerns when it 
comes to their real world application, particularly those issues that affect personal 
freedoms and rights. It is also important to emphasize that this thesis recognizes that there 
are other areas of contention not explored here, but these issues are the most germane to 
the topics already discussed.  
1. Divine Sovereignty versus Popular Sovereignty 
According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, the main challenge of an Islamic democracy 
lies in reconciling God’s sovereignty to the democratic concept of popular sovereignty.258 
The conflict between Ali and the Kharijites is the earliest embodiment of the 
contemporary movement in Islam that insists on God as the only source of law and 
government and calls for the literal interpretation of the Qur’an. This strict interpretation 
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of the Qur’an becomes problematic because, though it assumes that God is the only 
source of authority and laws, it also believes that there must be a man or a group of men 
that have perfect access to God: His will, His judgment, and His plan for humanity.259 
This line of thinking then assumes that man could become infallible. This concept has 
become the basis of many authoritarian governments in Islamic countries. Similar to the 
concept of divine sovereignty that dominated the early political context in the West, the 
autocrats claim to rule in God’s name, possessing the monopoly on religion and other 
aspects of society in order to dominate the people, who are in turn hesitant to question the 
authority of the ruler who claims to have divine assent.260 
The proponents of the strict interpretation of the Qur’an also believe that God has 
already expressed His judgment and commandments for man in the form of Shari’ah. 
Therefore, Shari’ah is complete, unquestionable, and applicable to every human situation 
there is, regardless of person, place and time.261 Those who subscribe to the strict 
interpretation of the holy sources dismiss the vice-regency of man, his judgment and his 
experiences as irrelevant to the pursuit of Allah’s will. It is clear that God created man to 
honor man, because man is created in His own image. Therefore, man’s free will and 
personal judgment is to be valued, guaranteed and protected, because doing so translates 
to honoring God Himself.262 When man interprets the word of God and uses it to guide 
his actions and desires, man is not questioning God’s authority. Instead, man is merely 
honoring God in an endless desire to seek His guidance. This also means that God has 
intended for man to be independent and to have considerable control over his life, 
including the interpretation of the Qur’an and the legislation of laws based upon it. Allah 
revealed the Qur’an to guide man’s affairs, and it is the personal struggle to do what is 
right and uphold justice that brings man peace, happiness and ever closer to God.  
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2. Apostasy 
One of the most contentious topic in the Islam-democracy debate is the Islamic 
view on apostasy (riddah or irtidad, leaving or retreating from the faith or becoming an 
unbeliever (murtadd or takfir)).263 Although the Qur’an declares that there is no 
compulsion in religion, Muslims are prohibited from leaving the faith. This is a major 
issue because the freedom to choose one’s religion, which involves converting from that 
religion after the fact, is a foremost requirement for democracy. Though there are no 
direct mentions in the Qur’an, death or banishment is the generally agreed upon 
punishment for being an apostate.264  
But over the years Islamic law has developed stringent requirements and 
evidentiary thresholds that must be met or else charges of apostasy must be dismissed 
(i.e., the required number of witnesses, the accused must have reached the age of 
majority, legally sane, and committed the act voluntarily, etc.).265 And to this effect, it is 
extremely difficult to prove cases of apostasy. Additionally, the Constitution of the 
Tunisian Republic clearly guarantees and protects religious freedom, promotes religious 
tolerance and moderation, and protects against unfounded and reckless charges of 
apostasy, as the age of Islamic extremism often uses this as a call and justification for 
jihad (the struggle or striving in the way of God, which often connotes struggle against 
unbelievers266).267   
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3. On Minority Rights and Women’s Rights 
Next is the potential for second class treatment of non-Muslim minorities and 
women in Muslim countries. Citizenship offers non-Muslims equal protection under the 
law, but some Muslims still believe that non-Muslims will only enjoy the full protection 
and guarantees of the state if they convert to Islam. In religious terms, the word dhimmi 
or protected People of the Book still connotes secondary status, especially in the West, 
and leaves room for doubt and consternation on whether other religious minorities 
besides Jews and Christians are in fact included in this provision.268 
For example, most Wasatiyya proponents believe that there should be limitations 
in the numbers of non-Muslims serving in the parliament or the elected Shura Council, or 
from holding the highest political post of the land, so as to prevent them from dominating 
the political organs of the state. The rationale behind these limitations is the overall 
national identity and culture, which for them must be strictly maintained as Muslim and 
Arab. This corresponds to the declarations in the Constitution of Tunisia, where Islam is 
the state religion and Arabic the national language and favored culture.269 
Similar restrictions are also held as the norm for women by some Muslims. They 
still expect women to remain at home, indicating a secondary status behind men, and that 
their number in the elected bodies must also be limited and bars them from holding the 
most senior positions in government. Women, in turn, have to be extra aware of how they 
conduct themselves in public, because it is easy to accuse them of impure and ungodly 
behavior. For instance, wearing a headscarf (hijab) or covering the face (niqab) in public 
is a sticky issue that the West views as restricting women’s rights in general. But for 
many Muslim women, veiling is part of being a Muslim. It is clear though that how the 
outside world views Muslim religious and cultural norms plays a significant role on how 
Islam is perceived as democratic or not.270 
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But again, the Constitution of Tunisia guarantees the equality and fair treatment 
of all its citizens: Men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Protection against 
maltreatment and violence focused on women and non-Muslim minorities is guaranteed 
by the constitution. In fact, the constitution allows for Muslim women to be elected as 
President, and there are no restrictions in the number of women or non-Muslims in 
elected bodies. The Tunisian Constitution guarantees equal opportunity and protection 
under law for both groups, including their equal representation in government and 
employment.271   
4. The Inseparability of Church and State in Islam 
Finally, there is the perennial issue of the non-separation of church and state in 
Islamic polity.272 The Constitution of Tunisia clearly states that the national religion is 
Islam. By comparison, although the separation of church and state is paramount in the 
United States democracy, comparable democracies like Great Britain (The Church of 
England, Anglican) and Norway (The Church of Norway, Evangelical-Lutheran) have a 
constitutionally declared official state religion and/or provide varying degrees of financial 
support or subsidies to nationally recognized religious institutions. The Queen, for 
example, is the head and supreme protector of the Church of England.273 
Other advance democracies that have official state religion include (in 
alphabetical order): Denmark (The Church of Denmark, Evangelical-Lutheran); Finland 
(The Church of Finland, Evangelical-Lutheran); Greece (Eastern Orthodox Christianity); 
Iceland (The Church of Iceland, Evangelical-Lutheran); Israel (Jewish); Italy (Roman 
Catholic); Liechtenstein (Roman Catholic); Luxembourg (Roman Catholic); Monaco 
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(Roman Catholic); Portugal (Roman Catholic); Spain (Roman Catholic); and Sweden274 
(The Church of Sweden, Evangelical-Lutheran). Clearly, the union of church and state is 
not unique to Islamic countries, or foreign to established democracies for that matter.275      
But the Constitution of Tunisia clearly describes the state as a civil institution 
based on democratic system of governance and the will of the people as the source of 
power and legitimacy.276 It also guarantees and protects freedom of religion and other 
personal freedoms and rights. In Muslim countries, Islam will always remain as the 
biggest influence in politics. This is the case not only because of the strong identity, 
tradition and heritage that define Muslim culture, but more importantly it is because 
Islam is not just a religion to Muslims: It is a way of life that encompasses every aspect 
of human existence. Polls indicate that Muslims in countries with substantial Muslim 
populations declare that religion is an important part of their daily lives.277 76% of 
Muslims surveyed by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life between 2008 and 
2012 say that religion is very important.278   
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
In conclusion, it is important to point out that Muslims consider Medina as the 
first and ideal Islamic democracy. The Constitution of Medina declares that Islam is the 
source of law and order, and each sect or distinct religious community within the city-
state maintains the right to administer the personal affairs of its own members. It 
stipulates that: All groups recognize the Prophet as the head of state; all groups pledge to 
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take part in defending the state and be loyal to it, and the state pledges to administer 
justice and protect the rights of groups and individuals; and finally, tribal and blood-
related preferences or concessions are repealed, and the community of Medina is now one 
single Ummah of Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims.279 Surely Medina 
evokes the spirit of democracy in Islam. 
Medina arguably represents the democratic roots inherent in Islam, and the 
Wasatiyya Trend undoubtedly looks toward this Golden Age to better pursue the best 
interest of Islam and the Ummah in the current global context of the 21st Century. 
Although several issues remain highly suspect—the issue of apostasy, certain restrictions 
on women and non-Muslims to occupy the highest post in the state, etc.,280 the Wasatiyya 
Movement has effectively presented a formidable case that proves that Islam and 
democracy are compatible. At a minimum, the centrist movement has provided a 
compelling repertoire of evidence backed by Islamic holy sources and heritage that 
reveals the dynamic link between Islam and democracy. This can surely open doors for 
dialogues, engagements and conceivable cooperation across the board to make the 
implementation of a democratic Islamic state within reach. Tunisia sheds a promising 
light in this challenging yet significant undertaking.  
It is important to reiterate that Wasatiyya acknowledges the flaws of democracy, 
yet it is also convinced that, in the current context, democracy is the best choice to protect 
the Ummah from tyranny and to advance its best interest.281 And most notably, the fact 
that this debate is even possible is a testament to the genuine Wasatiyya tendencies of 
moderation, justice and balance which encourage open mindedness, innovation in reason 
that adapts with changing time and place, and tolerance of diverse opinions, while 
maintaining a balanced approach rooted in the sacred principles of Islam.  
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So this is good news for Muslim countries and the rest of the world that have 
experienced the Arab Spring, which continues to demand greater popular empowerment 
(democratization) and the revival of Islam in the Muslim world. It is prudent for 
advanced democracies to give these newly-formed governments a chance to prove 
themselves of their capacity for self-determination and good governance. This is best 
accomplished through proactive engagement and cooperation at every level or 
opportunity, and by simply rendering the needed support when required.  
Vast majority of Muslims are conflicted between their admiration of freedom in the 
West and their desire for greater self-determination: They want democracy, but they do not 
want it imposed on them. To Muslims, democracy equals self-determination. They eschew 
the wholesale adaptation of Western democracy without regard to Islamic culture and 
traditions. Overall, majority of Muslims points to their negative perception of the West’s 
hatred and degradation of Islam and Muslims as the number one source of consternation. 
The poll by Gallup of more than 50,000 Muslims in 35 nations found that most wanted the 
West to instead focus on changing its negative view of Muslims and Islam.282   
Clearly, there is light at the end of the tunnel. There is plenty of common ground 
that can improve the outlook of the relationship between Muslims and the West. For 
instance, majority of Muslims in Africa are more likely to believe that the United States 
and the West show genuine concern for their country’s development, with Sierra Leone 
registering at 64%. Majority of Muslims in MENA also believe that the West is 
concerned about their well-being (64% in Turkey, 57% in Egypt, and 53% in Kuwait).283  
To put that into perspective, 46% of Americans have a negative view of Islam.284 
22% of Americans would not want Muslims as neighbors, and 44% say Muslims are too 
extreme in their religious beliefs. Less than 50% believe that American Muslims are loyal 
to the United States.285 Furthermore, 32% of Americans state that they admire nothing 
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about Islam and Muslims, while 25% say they just do not know. This is in contrast to 
Muslim respondents who say they admire nothing about the West: Only 6.3% in Jordan, 
10% in Saudi Arabia, and 1% in Egypt.286 Despite all this, 89% of Americans still say 
that they care about improving the relationship between Muslims and the West.287 
The common ground lies in the fact that even now, in the age of the Internet and 
ever-closer global ties, there is still much room for improvement in the area of increasing 
knowledge and familiarity between each and every one of us. For instance, only 28% of 
Muslims claim to know a great deal/some about Christian beliefs and practices,288 while 
57% of Americans express that they either know nothing or little about Islam and 
Muslims. Many still do not know the fact that Islam, Christianity and Judaism trace their 
lineage from the Prophet Abraham.289 Hope and promise are evident in the fact that many 
Americans report that the more they learn about Islam and Muslims, especially those who 
know at least one Muslim, the more likely they are to view them in a positive light.290  
As Qur’an 49:13 puts it best, God created humanity into tribes and nations, so 
that they may get to know each other through their differences.291 Islam established the 
foundation for the Islamic principles of pluralism and diversity, and most importantly, 
social cooperation and mutual assistance to achieve justice.292 Wasatiyya is leading the 
way in recognizing the need for people to get to know each other better, which will only 
foster greater prosperity and cooperation among nations. Surely then Islam and 
democracy will flourish. 
                                                 
286 Ibid., 141. 
287 The Pew Forum on Religious Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society 
(Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center, 2013), 155-158. 
288 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think 
(New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 60-61. 
289 “Comparison of Islam, Judaism and Christianity,” last modified May 20, 2013, 
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290 Ibid., 155. 
291 Muhammad Salim al-Awwa, “Political Pluralism from an Islamic Perspective,” in Islam in 
Transition: Muslim Perspectives, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 279-280. 
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